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roviding universal access to basic utilities is justified on human rights
grounds and also because of the positive externalities involved. Adequate
provision of water, sanitation and electricity contributes to the achievement of the
other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Access to these services, however,
is still unequal in the developing world. Services do not adequately reach the poor.
This Poverty in Focus brings together a mix of policy issues and some country experiences.
Degol Hailu and Raquel Tsukada provide an overview of the broad challenges involved
in making access to basic services equitable and universal.
Hulya Dagdeviren and Simon A. Robertson point out the difficulties of expanding utility
networks in slum areas, which include technical barriers and a lack of land and housing
tenure. They make a case for stronger public interventions.
Kate Bayliss argues that the allocation of demand and investment risks during
privatisation in Sub-Sahara Africa is distorted. This is because the risks are borne
by governments and end users instead of the private contractors.
David Hall and Emanuele Lobina provide a critique of both the investment potential
of the private sector and cost recovery schemes in the provision of sanitation services.
Ashley C. Brown discusses the externalities involved in supplying basic infrastructure to
those who can least afford it. He argues that, contrary to established views, cross-subsidy
schemes actually benefit all users and not only the targeted population.
Alison Post emphasises the benefits of water metering but highlights problems
of implementation and poor design in Argentina.
Degol Hailu, Rafael Osorio and Raquel Tsukada examine the reasons for the privatisation
and then renationalisation of the water supply in urban Bolivia.
Andre Rossi de Oliveira explores water privatisation in Brazil. He argues that the expansion
of coverage has stemmed mainly from high levels of investment by private operators.
Suani Teixeira Coelho, Patricia Guardabassi, Beatriz A. Lora and José Goldemberg note that
geographically isolated communities without access to electricity grids, such as those
in the Amazon, can be served by renewable energy sources.
Luc Savard, Dorothée Boccanfuso and Antonio Estache present the findings of a general
equilibrium model that assesses the impact of electricity price changes on the
poor in Mali and Senegal.
Joana Costa, Degol Hailu, Elydia Silva and Raquel Tsukada empirically show that water
provision reduces the total work burden on women in rural Ghana.
Nitish Jha conducts a sociological analysis of access to water and sanitation in India,
emphasising the challenges encountered in community-based schemes.
Julia Kercher explains why and how a human rights framework must guide
the design and implementation of private utility provision.
We hope that this collection of articles will contribute to the discussion
of how to provide vital infrastructure services more equitably.
This Poverty in Focus is the result of an International Workshop on Equitable Access
to Basic Services held on 5 December 2008 in São Paulo, Brazil. IPC-IG and the
David Rockefeller Centre for Latin American Studies at Harvard University (DRCLAS)
jointly organised the workshop. We gratefully acknowledge DRCLAS’ contribution.
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More than 1 billion people
globally are living in
extreme water deprivation.
Over 40 per cent of the
world’s population also
lack access to safe and
clean sanitation services.
About 1.6 billion people
worldwide do not have
access to electricity. Of these,
706 million are in South Asia
and 554 million in Africa.
While access to basic
services should be a human





face is to increase the
poor’s access to utilities
while simultaneously
reaping the benefits of
the positive externalities.
The Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) for water is to halve
the proportion of people without
access to safe drinking water by 2015.
The urgency of meeting this target
is reflected in the UNDP’s Human
Development Report 2006, which warns
that more than 1 billion people globally
are living in extreme water deprivation.
Over 40 per cent of the world’s
population also lack access to safe and
clean sanitation services. The report also
notes that “not having access to water
and sanitation is a polite euphemism for
a form of deprivation that threatens life,
destroys opportunity and undermines
human dignity” (UNDP, 2006, p. 5).
Similarly, about 1.6 billion people
worldwide do not have access to electricity.
Of these, 706 million are in South Asia
and 554 million in Africa, despite large
mining and industrial conglomerates
enjoying cheap access to an enormous
supply of electricity (see McDonald, 2009).
The figures indicate how inequitable
is access to basic utilities, both across
and within countries.
Communities with the least access to
utility infrastructure often live in slum
dwellings and remote areas. Rapid
urbanisation and informal settlements
pose particular problems for water
provision. As Hulya Dagdeviren and
Simon Robertson report, the number
of residential water connections
has fallen in most unplanned urban
settlements in the past decade.
The authors also highlight the
obstacles that large-scale private
providers cannot resolve without
imposing exorbitant tariffs to cover costs.
Those obstacles are two-fold in origin.
First, technical difficulties such as the
topographical location of informal
settlements pose physical challenges.
Second, lack of tenure for land and
housing creates uncertainties. In these
cases, market-oriented policies are not
appropriate means of providing access
to water in the slums of the developing
world. They note that “there are serious
doubts about the potential gains
of both privatised network utilities
(where planning and development
challenges persist) and small-scale service
providers (because of pricing and quality
issues). Ultimately, these concerns can be
resolved by investing in the expansion of
the public water and sanitation network.”
While access to basic services should
be a human right, it is also a public
good with numerous positive
externalities. The impact on the other
MDGs, for instance, is clear. Making
water, sanitation and electricity
available empowers women by freeing
them from the burden and dangers of
carrying water, often over long distances,
and allows them more time to attend
school. As Joana Costa et al. show, the
provision of utilities in rural Ghana
reduces the burden of unpaid work.
In addition, for women already engaged in
remunerated activities, work time seems
to have increased, which in turn has
a gender-empowering impact. They
stress that “additional public policies
are needed to achieve that goal
[reducing work burden], especially
policies related to educational training
and childcare facilities”.
The policy challenge that developing
countries face is to increase the poor’s
access to utilities while simultaneously
reaping the benefits of the positive
externalities. For the past two decades,
policy has focused mainly on private
investment and foreign capital. Just as the
“market failure” argument gave rise to
public ownership of certain enterprises,
so the “government failure” reasoning
paved the way for privatisation. The
latter was supported by developments
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choice, property rights and principal-
agent theories as justifications for
private ownership.
A fiscal case was also made: gains
from the sale of enterprises, savings from
subsidising unprofitable companies and
new tax revenues from the privatised
firms would improve government
budgets. Additionally, privatisation
was seen as a permanent shift to a market
economy—what the World Bank called
“lock-in” in the 1990s. Unlike, say, changes
in interest rates or exchange rates, which
can be reversed overnight, privatisation
was seen as a commitment to reform, one
that sent the right signals to investors.
The above arguments are well captured
in a World Bank (2004) research report,
which stated that:
“In a globalised economy, poorly
performing state-owned infrastructure
providers were increasingly seen
as constraining economic growth
and undermining international
competitiveness. Developing countries
simply could not continue to absorb
the fiscal burden of these enterprises.
Around the world, it became evident
to policymakers that the problems of
public enterprises could be solved
only by implementing radical structural
changes and realigning the roles
of the government and the private
sector” (p. 35).
Under utility privatisation and
commercialisation schemes, governments
usually retain ownership of assets while
inviting private contractors to run the
operations and provide management
services. While there are plenty of cases
in which publicly managed utilities are
marked by poor maintenance, wastage
and uncollected bills, social welfare goals
such as increasing the poor’s access to
basic services can be organised
successfully by public initiatives.
As Vickers and Yarrow (1991, pp. 113–114)
note: “public ownership may have the
advantage if externalities are larger
and the pursuit of personal agendas
is more constrained, for example by a
well-functioning political system.”
For instance, large private enterprises
can be highly inefficient, leading to
a concentration of market structures.
This is mainly related to a lack of
competing firms and scarce capital.
Such outcomes are confirmed by private
investors’ interest in sectors with less
competition, such as utilities.
The debate on private versus public
provision of utilities is complex, but
the guiding principle for the kind of
provision preferred must be the initial
level of access to water, sanitation and
electricity. Where access is already high in
developed and middle-income countries,
privatisation may yield productive and
dynamic efficiencies.
Private providers have incentives to
improve overall performance through
new techniques and novel management
processes. Where access to utilities is
low and the focus is on increasing
coverage of the poor in low-income
countries and neighbourhoods, public
provision makes sense. This is because
of problems associated with
affordability, how much cost recovery
can be pushed, and regulatory capacity.
The persistent challenge, however, is
financing investment outlays. The
options are reducing system losses
such as water leakages; improved
billing; domestic resource mobilisation;
and external financing (both donor and
private bond/equity financing).
Historical experiences are particularly
enlightening. Privatisation had been
relatively successful in the United
Kingdom and the United States, because
these countries embarked on private
utility provision after achieving 100
per cent access to water and electricity
by the 1980s. As David Hall and Emanuele
Lobina observe, “the sewerage systems in
Europe, the United States and Japan
were not developed through full cost
recovery from users; they were paid
for by distributing the costs among the
public, using taxation and cross-subsidy.”
The overall evidence is that privatisation
of utilities is not a solution where initial
access is low and the objective is the
coverage of the poor. This point is made in
the article on Bolivia by Degol Hailu et al.
The private concessionaire and the
government agreed on coverage
targets to provide universal access
in the city of La Paz and 82 per cent
coverage in El Alto by 2001. The poor’s
access to water connections increased,
but the private company could not meet
the targets. Inevitably, the limits of
cost recovery and profitability had been
reached. The tariff increases needed to
connect the additional poor consumers
were so high that they sparked
public outrage.
Similarly, as Alison Post reveals,
private concessionaires in Argentina
entered into a contract with the
government to increase water metering
up to 100 per cent. Fees were imposed
for the installation of the meters and
tariffs were increased. The result was
intense public protest. In Mali and
Senegal the poor have not benefited
from privatisation, simply because
they were not connected to the grid
in the first place. The tariff hikes after
privatisation affected them indirectly
as a result of economy-wide effects,
a point stressed by Luc Savard et al.
The concessions in Argentina,
Bolivia, Mali and Senegal have
all been terminated.
Contract cancellations and
renationalisation are often the result of a
policy that transfers risk to governments
and end users. As Kate Bayliss argues,
the focus in Sub-Saharan Africa has
been to transfer investment, demand and
currency risks in order to attract private
investors. She argues that “in industrialised
economies, the transfer of risk to the
private sector is considered essential if
efficiency gains from privatisation of
the delivery of basic services are to reach
end users. In SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa],
however, the emphasis is on reducing
the risks faced by the private sector in
order to encourage private investment.”
The upshot is always exorbitant tariffs
and neglected infrastructure. This
contrasts with the standard practice in
developed countries, where risk is usually
transferred to private providers at the
time of privatisation.
One reason why private participation in the
water sector has been successful in Brazil
seems to be the transfer of investment
risk. Contracts with the various
government entities at the state and
municipal levels clearly outlined the
investment obligations of the private
operators, particularly in low-income areas.Poverty in Focus   August 2009    5
As Andre Rossi de Oliveira points out, the
private operators had invested about
U$500 million by 2004. He underscores
that “the positive outcomes in Brazil
are related to contract design... Most
contracts stressed investment obligations,
something relatively easy to monitor.”
The limitations of public and private
provision to increase the poor’s access
to utilities have enhanced the role of
community and small-scale water
providers. The absence of economies
of scale, however, means that water
prices are typically high. Maintenance
facilities are inadequate and there
is no proper accountability for
service interruption.
The quality of small-scale providers’
supply is not always assured. Moreover,
it is not easy to regulate community and
small-scale providers, and neither is it
possible to engage in cross-subsidy.
In India, as Nitish Jha argues, community-
based water provision schemes are often
poorly designed and implemented.
Because of a lack of social cohesion,
vulnerable groups are often excluded
from decision-making processes.
What are the lessons? The debate
should move away from a narrow
focus on public versus private to
analysis of the constraints on public
intervention, possible improvements,
and the potential for alternative
provision under a poverty reduction
framework. Three issues seem to matter.
First, where initial utility coverage is
low, subsidy and cross-subsidy schemes
are the best alternative. As Ashley Brown
reminds us, another externality comes
from connecting the poor to infrastructure
networks though cross-subsidies.
All consumers benefit if the cross-subsidy
is designed in such a way that the poor
cover the variable cost and make some
contribution to fixed costs. Income-based
targeting schemes, for instance, with a
mix of some consumption-, age-
and geography-based targeting
of beneficiaries, can be sustainable.
Second, decentralised and locally based
utility provision has been promising
in the electricity sector. Geographically
isolated communities, such as those in
and around the Amazon, have benefited
from locally managed electricity
generating facilities. The difficulty has
been expanding the traditional grid
system in the densely forested areas.
As Suani Teixeira et al. report, following
the ambitious Light for Everyone
programme in Brazil, local renewable
energy-generating services using
photovoltaic, small-scale hydropower
and biomass sources have become
viable solutions.
Third, where initial access to utilities
is high and privatisation is considered,
better contract design is needed
to take account of political and social
considerations. Risk must be transferred
to private providers, not to governments
and consumers. As Julia Kercher explains
a human rights framework must guide
the design and implementation of
private provision based on the principles
of availability, accessibility, acceptability
and its quality.
Finally, utility provision can only
succeed if effective regulatory and
intuitional capacities are put in place
to enforce contracts and ensure the
efficiency of cross-subsidy mechanisms.
Regulation is most effective when laws
and institutions are stronger and are
free of political influence (see Estache
et al., 2003). Regulation is also country-
specific, while technical skills, legal
frameworks and dissemination of
information to the wider public
are essential. 
Estache, A., J. L. Guasch and L. Trujillo
(2003). “Price Caps, Efficiency Payoffs,
and Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation
in Latin America” , Policy Research
Working Paper 3129. World Bank
(Washington, D.C.).
McDonald, D. (ed.) (2009). Electric
Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the
Power Grid. London, Earthscan and Human
Sciences Research Council.
UNDP (2006). Beyond Scarcity: Power,
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis.
Human Development Report. New York,
Palgrave Macmillan.
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While there are plenty





bills, social welfare goals
such as increasing
the poor’s access to
basic services can be
organised successfully
by public initiatives.6 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth




for the expansion of water
and sanitation services.
Forced evictions are still
used extensively, especially
in Africa and Asia, where
over 14 million people
were evicted between
1998 and 2006.
The problem of inadequate access
to safe water is nowhere more pressing
than in the slums of the developing
world. Most countries in which a large
proportion of the urban population
live in squatter settlements are unlikely
to meet the water-related Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). This article
argues that market-oriented policies
make little, if any, difference in
those circumstances.
Trends in Slum Development
About a third of the world’s urban
population lived in slums in 1990, and
the total number of slum dwellers might
rise to 1.5 billion by 2020. Slum growth
has been particularly marked in Africa
where, on average, more than 70 per cent
of the urban population live in informal
settlement areas.
Public policies towards slums are highly
politicised. They are influenced by factors
such as the strength of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and other social
groups, as well as by the politics of slum
management. So far, governments have
dealt with squatter settlements and
the associated problems in three ways:
(i) clearing slums through forced
or legal evictions;
(ii)  applying public policies that range
from benign neglect to occasional
interventions; and
(iii)  regularising settlement conditions.
Forced evictions are still used extensively,
especially in Africa and Asia, where over
14 million people were evicted between
1998 and 2006 (UN-Habitat, 2007).
Access to Water in the Slums of
the Developing World
The increase in urbanisation and
its disproportionate concentration in
informal settlements pose problems for
the expansion of water and sanitation
services. Table 1 provides data on access
to safe water in the countries with the
largest slum populations in Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa, where conditions
are particularly drastic.
UN-Habitat’s original database, which
includes a larger number of countries,
shows that urban access to improved
water facilities declined in more than
a third of African countries during the
period 1990–2004. In many cities,
there is a notably low rate of access
to water through private household
connections from network infrastructure.
More than two-thirds of the urban
population in Africa depend on water
from non-residential connections.
In half of the African countries, the share
of residential water connections either
declined or was static.
by Hulya Dagdeviren
and Simon A. Robertson,
University of Hertfordshire Access to Water in
the Slums of the
Developing World
Table 1










Asian countries 1990 2001 1990 2004 1990 2004
Afghanistan 99 99 90 37 94 85
Nepal 97 92 5 4 59 48
Bangladesh 87 85 17 18 72 76
Pakistan 79 74 5 4 40 51
India 61 56 11 5 47 53
Sub-Saharan African countries
Ethiopia 99 99 19 19 98 68
Chad 99 99 59 59 90 90
Tanzania 99 92 15 15 67 57
Niger 96 96 38 20 81 65
Mozambique 95 94 17 28 67 82
Malawi 95 91 10 2 56 71
Mali 94 93 50 22 92 71
Uganda 94 93 20 13 76 93
Madagascar 91 93 20 23 72 84
Sudan 86 86 15 22 25 54
Source: UN-Habitat (2007).Poverty in Focus   August 2009    7
Table 2




East Asia and Pacific 6.6
South Asia 3.9
Latin America 17.2
Source: Hutton et al. (2006).
Lack of access to safe water in general,
and lack of residential supply in particular,
is positively correlated to the proportion
of the population living in unplanned
settlement areas. An important trend in
Africa, and to some extent in Asia, is that
improvements in access to safe drinking
water were frequently accompanied
by a decline in residential connections
during the period 1990–2004. In other
words, more people now rely on public
standpipes, boreholes, “protected” wells
and springs.
Challenges for Public Utilities in Improving
Access to Safe Water in the Slums
1. Technical difficulties of infrastructure
extension: The supply problems facing
public utilities are exacerbated by
a number of barriers that make it
impractical to build the network in
some slum areas. The most important are:
 The topographical location of
settlements in previously unused
land such as hills, ravines, flood
plains and desert land.
 The physical conditions of the
settlements, which are marked by a
random and haphazard development
pattern and overcrowding.
 The quality of the materials used
to build housing units, such as
thickened mud, plant leaves and
stems, tin and plaster boards, which
are unsuitable for permanent water
pipes and taps.
2. Lack of tenure for land or housing: the
result of the invasion of public or private
land, can pose a significant obstacle to
the provision of water services. This is
because provision by utilities and the
extension of water services by local
authorities often depend on the
existence of legal tenure for property.
These two issues are challenging for
public policy. Overcoming the difficulties
associated with the settlement conditions
outlined in (1) requires relocation of
slum dwellers to more suitable areas
and enforcement of housing standards.
Granting full tenure in order to tackle the
problems associated with the insecurity of
tenure outlined in (2) may raise property
prices and encourage the development
of new slum areas. Dwellers may sell their
plots and squat elsewhere. The policy
may benefit the non-poor, especially
property merchants. Opposition to
redistributive policies, involving
relocation and/or the formalisation of
slums, can be testing for governments.
Can Privatisation of Utilities
Provide an Answer?
Thus far, policies geared to improving
access to water have emphasised the
importance of market-oriented solutions
(World Bank, 2004). The shift towards
private or commercialised services has
meant that direct public investment in
the water sector has declined. But the
resulting gap has not been offset by
private sector investments (Estache, 2006).
Where public utilities have been privatised
there have been numerous problems
related to cost recovery, affordability
and regulation of services. Private service
providers have not performed better than
public operators. Nonetheless, though
the outcomes have been disappointing,
the drive for privatisation continues with
renewed emphasis following a short
period of critical reflection.
The potential for privatisation is even
more limited in countries where a
significant proportion of the urban
population live in squatter settlements.
In these settlements, the multifaceted
nature of the problems (such as tenure,
technical difficulties in building water
infrastructure, widespread poverty, high
population turnover) seriously constrain
the capacity of privatised utilities.
Types of Informal Water Services in the
Slums and Their Limitations
In the middle- and upper middle-income
countries, slums are often supplied from
the public network. In low-income
economies, however, the provision of
water in informal settlements is dominated
by community-managed water schemes
and small-scale private suppliers.
Community managed water schemes:
Typically, these are facilitated by NGOs
that help the community to build a
shared water point such as water kiosk,
which is then managed and run by
people employed by the community’s
members. These small-scale projects are
crucial to the provision of water in the
absence of other alternatives, but they
are not problem-free. Water charges are
higher and cross-subsidisation is not
feasible because the projects do not
benefit from economies of scale. Their
long-term maintenance can be difficult
because of a lack of social cohesion,
financial resources, and technical and
management capacity.
Small-scale private water suppliers: Some
50 per cent of the urban population in
Africa obtain water from small suppliers.
These include water tankers, street
vendors and other water re-sellers
(that is, households with a piped supply
or wells in their yards selling water to
those without access). Their services are
problematic for three reasons. First, their
prices are much higher, partly because
they lack economies of scale. Second, the
quality of the water is highly dependent
on the quality of sanitation services in
the locale. Finally, where regulation
is absent (which is often typical), prices
may be subject to collusion. While
it is desirable to regulate small, private
suppliers, it is intrinsically difficult and
costly to do so because of their size,
variety and number.
Policy Recommendations
There are three fundamental reasons
why governments should play a more
active role in the provision of water and
sanitation. First, universal access to safe
drinking water has positive externalities
in the form of lower rates of illness and
mortality, an associated increase in
productivity, and reduced medical
costs. The returns from universal water
coverage can be significant, varying from
US$4 for each dollar invested in sub-
Saharan Africa to US$17 in Latin America
(Table 2). Second, privatisation is not an
option in poor and low-income areas
where services are not profitable.8 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
In industrialised economies,
the transfer of risk to the
private sector is considered
essential if efficiency gains
from privatisation of the
delivery of basic services
are to reach end users.
In SSA, however, the
emphasis is on reducing
the risks faced by the private
sector in order to encourage
private investment.
In the energy sector,
the contractual terms of the
PPA mean that demand risk
rests with the government.
All the power produced is
sold to the state-owned
transmission utility and the
amount sold is fixed so the
private sector has no
demand risk.
Finally, as outlined above, there are
specific failures associated with non-state,
small-scale supply systems.
In short, solutions to the lack of
safe water services in the slums
of the developing world lie in
the following approaches:
 Coordinated public sector
interventions: Improving water
services depends heavily on
upgrading slum conditions
more generally. Urban planning
and tenure issues require
multifaceted interventions
within the remit of governments.
That requires thinking outside the
“water and sanitation box” (IIED, 2003).
 The expansion of public network
utility: Long-term policy should be
devised in light of the costs and
benefits of alternative systems of
provision. There are serious doubts
about the potential gains of both
privatised network utilities (where
planning and development
challenges persist) and small-scale
service providers (because of pricing
and quality issues). Ultimately, these
concerns can be resolved by investing
in the expansion of the public
water and sanitation network. 
Estache, A. (2006). ‘PPI Partnerships vs.
PPI divorces in LDCs’, Review of Industrial
Organization 29, 3–26.
Hutton, G., L. Haller and J. Bartram (2006).
“Economic and Health Effects of Increasing
Coverage of Low Cost Water and Sanitation
Interventions” , HDR Office Occasional Paper.
New York, UNDP.
IIED (2003) Water and Sanitation: Water
Will Deliver the Improvements Required
for Urban Areas. International Institute for
Environment and Development. London.
UN-Habitat (2007). Enhancing Urban Safety
and Security: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2007. Un-Habitat. Nairobi.
World Bank (2004). Reforming Infrastructure:
Privatization, Regulation, and Competition.
Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Rates of access to water and
electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
remain below those of other developing
regions. More than 42 per cent of all
Africans—some 300 million people—
lack access to an improved water supply
and 64 per cent—477 million people—
do not have adequate sanitation.
Only one in four Africans has access to
electricity, and in some countries access
rates are as low as 7 per cent.
Infrastructure financing requirements
for water and energy in SSA exceed the
amounts that donors and governments
can provide. Policy-makers are looking
to the private sector to reduce the
“financing gap” and to bring efficiency
to ailing utilities (Bayliss, 2009).
Private sector participation (PSP) in
infrastructure peaked in 1997 before
tailing off, but is now increasing (Figure 1).
Telecommunications attracted most
investor interest. On a regional level, just
6 per cent of total private investment
went to SSA between 1990 and 2007
(Figure 2) and over 70 per cent of this
was for telecommunications. Less than 1
per cent was for water and sewerage.
Donors and country governments have
increased their efforts to attract private
investment into infrastructure in
SSA. Central to these policies and
programmes is the reduction of risk
for the private sector.
The generally accepted principle of risk
allocation is that risk should lie with the
party best able to manage it. While this is
fairly straightforward at the two ends
of the spectrum—construction risk lies
with the private investor, and political
risk with the government—there are
numerous grey areas in between, such as
demand risk, investment risk and the risk
of fluctuations in the prices of key inputs,
as well as currency devaluation.
In industrialised economies, the transfer
of risk to the private sector is considered
essential if efficiency gains from
privatisation of the delivery of basic
services are to reach end users. In SSA,
however, the emphasis is on reducing the
by Kate Bayliss,
School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London Private Investment in
African Infrastructure:
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risks faced by the private sector in
order to encourage private investment.
As a result, the burden of risk has shifted
towards governments, taxpayers and
end users—not because of their ability
to manage it, but because of a focus
on the needs of private investors. Using
the private sector to provide infrastructure
also poses additional risks for the public
sector (Bayliss, 2009). Some risk allocation
mechanisms are explored below.
Investment Risk
Sector policies are increasingly designed
to ensure that governments—rather than
private businesses—bear investment
risk using sector restructuring and
government guarantees. The water sector
has been restructured in a number of
countries to separate ownership of the
assets from the day-to-day running
of the service. The state assumes the
asset ownership and is responsible
for investment in infrastructure, while
operations such as billing and revenue
collection are offered for privatisation.
This approach has been adopted in
Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania and Cameroon,
and is planned for Angola.
The much-needed finance for
infrastructure investment is provided
by the government and/or donors;
examples are water privatisation in
Ghana and Tanzania, electricity in Kenya
(Leigland, 2008) and planned electricity
privatization in Senegal. This is intended
to bring in private sector efficiency while
not deterring investors by requiring
them to actually commit finance.
The private sector may make
recommendations or even decisions
regarding investment, but does not have
to finance the investment itself.
With electricity, PSP has mainly taken the
form of stand-alone private generation
plants. These are usually underwritten
by power purchase agreements (PPAs),
whereby the state-owned power
company makes a commitment to
buy all the power produced at a price
fixed in foreign currency. These contract
terms are usually fixed for 20 years
or more and are underwritten by a
sovereign guarantee, thereby protecting
the private sector from investment risk.
Demand Risk
Various methods are used to protect
investors from demand risk in the water
Sector policies















Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.10 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
sector. These include payment to the
contractor based on availability of service
rather than demand, and a payment
system whereby the government
commits to top up fees if they fall
below a certain level. Alternatively,
remuneration can be in the form of
a flat rate that is not based on user fees.
In the energy sector, the contractual
terms of the PPA mean that demand risk
rests with the government. All the power
produced is sold to the state-owned
transmission utility and the amount
sold is fixed so the private sector has
no demand risk.
Where demand falls below expectations,
the private sector may seek to increase
prices to make up for a decline in the
overall revenue position. For example,
when drought caused a reduction in
power consumption in Uganda because
of load-shedding, the private distributor
threatened to raise unit prices in
order to compensate.
Input Cost and Currency Risk
Investors prefer prices (rather than
subsidies) to cover costs, since this
reduces their reliance on government
payments. Institutionalised tariff-setting
practices established in much of SSA
allocate cost fluctuations to end users
through “automatic tariff adjustment” (ATA).
This means that variations in exogenous
costs such as inflation, exchange rates
and key inputs like fuel are automatically
incorporated into the tariff structure for
water and electricity; this happened, for
example, in Ghana, Nigeria and Cape
Verde. In Uganda, a clear reason for ATA
is to provide operating companies with a
reasonable profit and to give confidence
to current and new investors.
ATA can lead to moral hazard. There is no
reason for the private investor to try to
lower exposure to currency devaluation,
for example, when the cost can be
passed on to consumers. The use of ATA
pricing methods conflicts with the notion
that risks should rest with those best
able to manage them.
In SSA, end users are not best able
to manage the risk of exchange rate
fluctuations and changes in fuel input
costs. They have no control over these
costs and cannot diversify away from
essential services such as electricity and
water unless they increase the use of less
safe alternatives. Consumers of utility
services in SSA have the least bargaining
power. Such an approach is a clear
demonstration of the way in which the
needs of investors take priority over
those of end users.
Additional Risks for Governments
As well as absorbing risks from the
private sector, PSP raises further risks for
governments. The process of preparing
for PSP is costly and demanding.
Countries have restructured utilities and
drafted new legislation to encourage PSP,
spending vast amounts on consultants,
yet governments face the risk that there
will be little or no interest from the
private sector.
In theory, competitive bidding is
regarded as essential in order to derive
efficiency gains from privatisation.
In practice, lack of competition in SSA
seems to be overlooked.
In Cameroon, the government spent
nearly a decade trying to privatise the
water utility before finally managing it
in 2007. In Senegal, privatisation of
the electricity distribution utility was
attempted in 1997 and again in 2001. The
government is now trying for a third time.
In Lusaka, plans to privatise the water
utility were eventually shelved after
several years when it became clear
that the risk profile was still too high for
investors. In Malawi, the Lilongwe and
Blantyre Water Boards were readied
for sale in 1996 but privatisation was
eventually dropped in 2004.
Sometimes few bids are received.
There was only one bid for the
privatisation of water in Dar es Salaam.
PSP creates information asymmetries.
Regulation relies on information
provided by the private firm. Governments
face a high risk that firms will not comply
with disclosure requirements, and they
are in a weak bargaining position when
few bids have been received. Investors
boost their own profits from PSP in
various ways, such as paying themselves
technical assistance fees or using transfer
pricing to pay a subsidiary company
for services or inputs. This lowers the
profitability of the concession but
increases the overall revenue of
the investor (Leigland, 2008).
Such practices can be complex and might
not be disclosed, making it virtually
impossible for the regulator to judge
what profit is being made. Weak state
capacity is presented as a reason for
introducing PSP, but weak government
skills can undermine the efficiency gains
PSP is supposed to bring if private firms
are not effectively regulated.
Conclusion
PSP now has such momentum that it is
effectively a policy goal in itself. But the
efforts that governments make in order
to mitigate the risks that the private
sector faces also mitigate the supposed
gains from the introduction of PSP
in infrastructure in SSA.
The private sector brings virtually no
investment finance to water. The finance
that is leveraged in the electricity sector
is at high cost and secured with long-
term government guarantees.
Lack of competition and ineffective
regulation threaten to counteract the
supposed efficiency benefits of PSP.
By the time the state has enough
capacity to effectively regulate the
private sector it could, arguably,
provide the service itself.
Furthermore, sector policies have
been reduced to creating an attractive
environment for investors, to the
detriment of competing priorities such
as equitable access. Prices have increased
substantially and essential investment
in infrastructure has been neglected
because attention has focused
on privatisation. 
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The sewerage systems in
Europe, the United States and
Japan were not developed
through full cost recovery
from users; they were paid for
by distributing the costs
among the public, using
taxation and cross-subsidy
The explicit or implicit
position of most of the
official donor publications





The idea that the private
sector can or will invest
significant money in
developing sanitation
or sewerage systems is
also now known
to be wrong.
by David Hall and Emanuele Lobina,
PSIRU Business School,
University of Greenwich
Hall D. and E. Lobina (2008), “Sewerage Works –
Public investment in sewers saves lives”,
Public Sector International Research Unit (PSIRU),
University of Greenwich, UK. Available at: <http://
www.psiru.org/reports/2008-03-W-sewers.doc>.
The current discussion of sanitation
marginalises sewerage, usually on the
grounds that it is too expensive for
most developing countries. Yet sewerage
systems have a massive impact on public
health, especially child health. This is a
classic example of a public good, and
an affordable infrastructure investment
for countries in which the great majority
of people need a connection.
Urban sewerage was first developed
in the ancient cities of the Indus valley
around 4000 BC, and is thus a South
Asian invention. The first modern
system was introduced in London
in the nineteenth century, and had
four key features:
1. the technology of a network of
sewers throughout the city, flushed
by water;
2. public administrative structures to
finance, build and manage these
“expensive works”;
3. a public environmental measure,
rather than an attempt to alter
individual behaviour;
4. a universal public measure applied
to everyone, not selectively targeted
(Mackenbach, 2007).
These same principles have been applied
in every high-income country in the
world. It was very expensive to develop
the system and it was financed from
taxation or massive cross-subsidies:
“public financing of sanitation
infrastructure was seen as the only
option for ensuring investment adequate
to protect public health” (UNDP, 2005, p. 83).
The same principle of cross-subsidy
continues to be applied in Europe at a
transnational level. The European Union
raises taxes in all member states, the
equivalent of €20 per person per year, to
support the cost of water and sanitation
improvements in the poorer countries.
The need for new urban sewerage is
highly concentrated in relatively few
countries. Half of all the new sewerage
connections needed to meet a target of
halving the urban population without a
household sewerage connection are in just
four countries: India, China, Indonesia and
Brazil. Three-quarters of all the connections
needed are in just 20 countries.
The next question is how this need can
be met, and particularly how it should be
financed. The main policy advice of
donors and development banks
emphasises three key policy positions:
 the insistence on the need to finance
developments through cost recovery
from users;
 the preference for a central role
for the private sector;
 the assumption that sewer systems are
too expensive and thus unaffordable.
The UN World Water Development Report
(WWDR), for example, states:
“Population growth and burgeoning
water demand have convinced most
policy-makers that the cost of water
system development will increasingly
have to be met by users, especially if the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
are to be achieved … With private sector
participation—ranging from small water
vendors to large private utilities—
projected to increase in the next decades,
the issue of pricing is critical”
(UNESCO, 2006, p. 419).
However, the sewerage systems in
Europe, the United States and Japan
were not developed through full cost
recovery from users; they were paid
for by distributing the costs among the
public, using taxation and cross-subsidy.12 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Source: PSIRU calculations based on World Bank, JMP (Joint Monitoring Programme of the World Health Organization
and the United Nations Children’s Fund), UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), and
Hutton and Bartram (2008).
Table 1
Cost of Household Connections for Water and Sewerage












cost as % GDP
China 251 22% 7,878 0.30 -
India 184 16% 5,764 0.64
Indonesia 73 6% 2,291 0.73
Brazil 60 5% 1,881 0.21 -
Nigeria 43 4% 1,364 1.48 440
Philippines 34 3% 1,069 0.89
Pakistan 32 3% 1,000 0.82
Bangladesh 27 2% 855 1.22 156
Iran 25 2% 790 0.38 -
Congo DR 15 1% 485 6.29 408
Total in all 1,141 100% 34,900 2236
developing
countries
Total of top 4 568 50%
(China, India,
Indonesia, Brazil)
An important step was to move
away from private consumer choice to
collective public decisions to connect all
households: “Connection to a main sewer
was compulsory for households, and
therefore it was covered by local taxes”
(Barraqué, 2007, p. 124).
The idea that the private sector
can or will invest significant money
in developing sanitation or sewerage
systems is also now known to be wrong.
A World Bank research paper, reviewing
actual private investment in a 22-year
period from 1983 to 2004, concluded
bluntly that:
“PPI [private participation in
infrastructure] has disappointed—
playing a far less significant role in
financing infrastructure in cities than was
hoped for, and which might be expected
given the attention it has received and
continues to receive in strategies to
mobilize financing for infrastructure …
PPI is inherently limited in scope for
financing urban infrastructure for
the wide array of non-commercial
infrastructure services cities need”
(Clarke Annez, 2006).
The explicit or implicit position of most
of the official donor publications is that,
despite the clear balance of benefits,
household sewerage connections cannot
be afforded. Measured as a proportion of
GDP, however, the capacity of developing
economies to manage this form of
investment is surprisingly high.
Table 1 uses World Bank/World Health
Organization estimates of the annual
costs of investments needed to meet
the MDGs, with full household water
and sewerage connections, for the 20
countries that account for 90 per cent of
the need for urban sewerage connection.
For many of the middle-income
countries, the cost is less than half of 1
per cent of GDP per year. China, Brazil
and India already plan to spend as much
on development of water and sanitation
as these estimates suggest is needed for
the MDGs with the household-
connection and urban-sewerage target.
For some lower-income countries, the cost
would exceed 1 per cent of GDP per year.
If donor aid were concentrated on these
cases, the total aid required is about
US$2.2 billion per year, which also seems
perfectly affordable.
This level of spending makes greater
demands on countries’ taxation
systems. Establishing sustainable
public revenues, and building the
capacity of public authorities, are
thus more important for developing
these services than cost recovery from
users or creating opportunities for
private investors.
From the other perspective, water
and sanitation investments can drive
the development of public finance
mechanisms, such as municipal bonds,
as they did in European and North
American countries a century ago.
Donors should stop encouraging
countries to try to finance the
development of sewerage systems
through cost recovery from users, and
stop encouraging countries to believe
that the private sector will make
any significant contribution to
investment in sanitation. 
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If the poor lose service
because they are unable to
pay, the network becomes
smaller and its value for all
customers is diminished.
The rationale for
finding ways to provide
infrastructure services to
the poor seems compelling
for a variety of reasons.
Since doing so will
doubtlessly require
subsidies, it is critical that
the subsidy, if it is to be
effective and sustainable,
should be efficient,





regulation is fraught with externalities
that cannot go unaddressed. One
externality that unquestionably intrudes
into infrastructure regulation is the
provision of regulated products and
services to those who cannot afford
to bear the full cost of obtaining them.
In dealing with the dilemma of making
infrastructure available to the poor, some
basic issues are unavoidable. They can be
characterised as Why, Who and How.
Why?
The basic reasons for supplying such
services as electricity, water/sanitation,
telecommunications and fuel to the poor
are both humanitarian and pragmatic.
Those basic services allow the poor to
have a better quality of life, be healthier,
be better educated and informed, and
lead more productive lives. The provision
of these services to areas where the poor
are concentrated also increases the
likelihood of broader economic
development that makes possible a long-
term and sustainable reduction in poverty.
Enabling poor households to obtain
infrastructure services is not simply a
matter of humanitarianism. There are
often overlooked network benefits for
everyone in keeping poor customers on
the network. If a cross-subsidy is designed
so that tariffs for poor consumers require
them to make payments that cover all of
the variable costs of serving them, and to
make some contribution to the fixed costs
of the system, then all other customers
benefit by retaining the subsidised
customers on the network rather than
losing them and having to absorb the
fixed costs that otherwise would have
been paid by the poor.
In telecommunications, having more
people connected enhances the value of
network access for everyone. If the poor
lose service because they are unable to
pay, the network becomes smaller and its
value for all customers is diminished.
Enabling the poor to retain electricity,
water and other infrastructure service
may also have net social benefits in
the areas of health, the environment,
encouragement of microenterprises
and even education. Finally, if affordable
access is provided there is less incentive
to illegally obtain service and a greater
likelihood of producing some revenue
rather than none at all. Subsidies to the
poor therefore provide real benefits
and do not only entail costs.
Who?
Despite the indisputable evidence that
regulatory decisions about infrastructure
can have significant social effects, there is
a vigorous debate about whether
regulators are the appropriate authorities
to address those issues, or whether such
decisions should be left to policy-makers.
Those who contend that regulators
should refrain from intruding into
externalities such as poverty argue that
regulators are given specifically-defined
legal powers. The exercise of those
powers may well have effects far beyond
the regulated sector but, in the view
of those who take a narrow view of
regulatory powers, that does not justify
regulators stepping outside those
constraints. Proponents of that view,
however, neither deny the effects
of regulatory actions nor necessarily
believe that those effects should go
unaddressed. Rather, advocates of
limited regulatory powers contend
that addressing the external effects
of regulatory policies and decisions
should be left to broader policy-makers,
such as legislators and/or executive figures.
Legislative and executive decision-
makers, it is argued, are more
by Ashley C. Brown,
Harvard Electricity Policy Group,




Why, Who and How?14 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
accountable to the public in making
what are essentially political decisions.
Moreover, political authorities have
access to broader resources than those
available to regulators (such as the public
treasury and taxing powers) to address
the external effects. Some maintain that
since the resources available to
regulators are the revenues collected
for regulated services and products,
any effort to direct those revenues
toward social objectives—such as
alleviating poverty—will inevitably
distort price signals that will adversely
affect the overall efficiency of the sector.
Of course, a countervailing argument
is made by those who contend that
regulators must be conscious of, and
perhaps should specifically address, the
external effects of their decisions. There
are several arguments for that point of
view. The first relates to the fact simply
because laws may not explicitly address
externalities does not necessarily mean
that policy-makers did not intend
regulators to address them, but only
that they did not or could not have
anticipated all of those effects. Moreover,
most regulatory statutes require that
regulators fully consider the impact
of their decisions on consumers.
A second argument is that regulators,
being somewhat insulated politically,
can address poverty issues in a more
targeted, efficient, less politicised and
therefore more sustainable manner than
politicians.1 Hence there is a trade-off:
on the one hand, regulators may create
cross-subsidies in order to address
poverty issues, and thereby make pricing
less efficient; on the other hand, they
are more likely than politicians to
make subsidisation more efficient and
sustainable. On balance, the trade-off
may be worth making. In many cases,
political officials, in order to avoid
making difficult choices, would simply
prefer that regulators assume
responsibility for the poor.
How?
Regardless of who decides, there
are fundamentally different ways of
designing subsidies and cross-subsidies
for the poor. Each approach has both
beneficial and adverse aspects. They fall
broadly into four different structural
approaches: (i) consumption-based;




assumes that, as a general rule, the poor
consume less infrastructure service than
do more affluent customers. Thus tariffs
might be designed so that customers pay
less for an initial block of consumption
than for consumption above that
threshold (for example, $0.05 per kWh of
electricity per month for the first 60 kWh,
and $0.09 per kWh for every kWh
consumed beyond 60 kWh). Another
variation of the consumption-based
approach is to use a two-part tariff
(one part reflecting fixed costs and the
other reflecting variable costs) and to
allocate a greater share of the costs
to the variable part of what the
customer pays. Since the fixed costs are
unavoidable but the variable costs can
be avoided by reducing consumption,
low-use customers are advantaged.
While the latter approach is not
ordinarily used specifically to help the
poor, those who favour a consumption-
based approach have often argued that
it serves that purpose.
The benefits of the consumption-based
approach are that it is relatively easy to
administer, it encourages conservation,
it is generally consistent with
longstanding tariff practices, and it is
easily understood. If pre-paid meters are
used, it also has the benefit of being self-
enforced. Those benefits, however, may
be outweighed by the weaknesses of the
approach. The most important weakness
is that its basic assumption—that
the poor and low-volume users are
essentially the same consumers—may
very well be wrong. Many low-volume
consumers are not necessarily poor, such
as the elderly, single-person households
and users in vacation homes.
Since eligibility is based on consumption,
not income, many relatively affluent
customers will gain from tariffs designed
to benefit the poor. Additionally,
modifying the allocation of costs
between fixed and variable costs in
order to subsidise the poor better, as
opposed to actually reflecting costs, can
send significantly distorted price signals
to the consuming public in general.
Consumption-based approaches,
therefore, while relatively easy to effect,
may be highly inefficient.
Age-based
Age based programmes assume
either that age and poverty are closely
correlated, or that age groups such as the
elderly or children merit subsidies as part
of a general social welfare programme.
Since this article is about poverty, it does
not discuss the latter motivation. Such
programmes, particularly when focused
on retirees, are often politically popular
and are therefore appealing to some
politicians. The programme design is
quite straightforward: either through
some methodology or administrative
fiat, a discounted tariff is established
for all customers who are age-eligible or,
perhaps, who have age-eligible persons
in the household.
The benefits of an age-based programme
are that it is both easy to administer and,
absent fraud, is utterly transparent in
terms of who benefits. The problem,
however, is that many households have
elderly and children who are not poor,
and who therefore do not need a subsidy
for utility service. Hence age-based
programmes are not poverty-specific
and are therefore highly inefficient.
As noted below, it is possible to
superimpose an income test on an age-
based programme, but that means that
a decision has been taken to make
service affordable to some poor
householdsbut not to others.
Geography-based
Usually, geography-based programmes
are based only partly on consideration
for the poor. More often than not they
are designed to promote rural services
such as electrification, or to foster
economic development in a particular
region. As with age-based programmes,
a tariff is set on the basis of some
methodology or by administrative fiat,
and that tariff provides a discount to
customers located in a defined territory.
Understandably, such programmes are
appealing to local politicians.
The benefits of a geography-based
programme are that it is very simple
to administer and, like age-basedPoverty in Focus   August 2009    15
programmes, is transparent in terms
of identifying the beneficiaries.
The problem is that most if not all
geographic regions have poor and
non-poor residents. Thus the subsidy
will have many unintended beneficiaries,
a circumstance that makes it inefficient
and of dubious sustainability. It is also
highly subject to politicisation, as has
happened in India, where rural subsidies
are prevalent and are very difficult to
eliminate or even reduce once they
are in place.
Income-based
The income-based approach is
conceptually simple. Poverty is usually
defined in terms of family income, and
customers whose income is below a
certain threshold are offered services
under tariffs designed to maintain
service to the poor. Once eligibility is
determined, there may be two basic
second stages. One is to apply one
of the other approaches (consumption,
geography, or age) and superimpose
an income eligibility test for them so
that customers can only qualify for the
subsidy if their income qualifies and
they meet one of the other criteria.
The alternative second step is to devise
a tariff geared to income. An example
is a tariff that requires income-eligible
customers to pay either a stated
percentage of their income or the full bill,
whichever is less. Hence the customer
never has to pay more than that
percentage of income. The percentage
can be derived from what a typical
household pays for that service.2 If the
percentage of income is less than the
full amount owed, either the balance is
forgiven or, if it is not entirely forgiven,
at least the service cannot be terminated
for non-payment as long as the income-
percentage payment is current.
The benefit of an income-based system
is that it specifically targets the verifiably
poor, and thus the subsidy itself is highly
efficient. The effect of the programme is
also quite transparent because, absent
fraud, it is beneficial only to people
who are verifiably poor. Income-based
programmes also put the ability to avoid
disconnection for non-payment into the
hands of the poor, thereby eliminating a
convenient excuse governments and
companies often use for failure to
enforce payment obligations. The
problem is that the system is difficult
to administer because it requires
documentation of income-eligibility,
a process that can be labour-intensive
and subject to fraud. This difficulty
might be mitigated when there are other
government programmes that require
income, eligibility and a person’s
participation in such a programme
automatically makes them eligible
for an income-based payment system.
As regards income-based payments
(as opposed to income-eligibility
requirements), economists have argued
that the price signals are incorrect since
the customer payments are not linked
to consumption. Thus, it is argued,
income-based programmes provide an
incentive for inefficient and wasteful use
of energy. For many customers that may
be true, but the poor cannot afford to
buy as many appliances that use energy
or water, and thus it is not clear that
price signals carry much significance.
Additionally, customers being served on
an income-based tariff can be required to
take part in energy-efficiency programmes.
Conclusion
The rationale for finding ways to provide
infrastructure services to the poor seems
compelling for a variety of reasons.
Since doing so will doubtlessly require
subsidies, it is critical that the subsidy,
if it is to be effective and sustainable,
should be efficient, well targeted at the
poor, and professionally administered
in ways that limit politicisation. Given
the considerations set out above, it is
sensible that regulators be empowered
to play a key role in designing and
administering the programme, that the
programme include elements that focus
carefully on providing benefits only to
intended beneficiaries, and that it does
so on an efficient and sustainable basis. 
1. There are innumerable examples around the world
of well-intentioned politicians who create subsidies
for the poor but are unable to resist the entreaties of
more affluent customers seeking to be deemed
eligible for the subsidised rates. Rural subsidies
for electricity in India and natural gas subsidies for
the elderly in Philadelphia come to mind.
2. In the US State of Ohio, the first to adopt such a
system in 1983, the percentage was 15 per cent





may also have net
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reducing total demand and
thereby helping utilities
maintain adequate pressure
levels in outlying districts.
Introducing water metering
on a more widespread basis
in developing countries
promises to have numerous
positive effects, especially
for poorer city-dwellers
living on the urban fringe.
Metering should lower
overall demand, thereby
allowing utilities to expand
services and improve
pressure levels in outlying
districts with fewer major
new investments in
system capacity.
Two contrasting yet related scenes
can be observed in Argentine cities
during hot summer months. In affluent
central districts, apartment building
superintendents begin the day by
washing off the sidewalks in front of
their residences, waving hose nozzles
from side to side as if water were free.
Meanwhile, in outer and often less
affluent districts, water pressure falls to
such low levels that utilities must ration
service; running water may only be
available a few hours a day.
Water metering systems can help rectify
such unfair allocations of a scarce resource.
Metering consumption provides
strong disincentives against wasteful
consumption, reducing total demand and
thereby helping utilities maintain adequate
pressure levels in outlying districts.
Reducing total demand, where there is
shortage of water, also enables utilities to
use existing infrastructure more efficiently,
thereby freeing up system capacity for
expansion into the urban fringe, where the
urban poor tend to live in many developing
countries. This is very important, because
the construction of facilities such as water
and sewerage plants does not tend to
be accorded political priority; after all,
they are not as visible as bridges or
schools and do not deliver concrete
benefits to individual constituents.
As a result, governments tend to under-
invest in such “invisible” infrastructure.
Water metering, along with private sector
management and regulation, was
advocated by international institutions
under the Washington Consensus reform
programme of the late 1980s and 1990s.
Despite the aforementioned benefits for
overall system efficiency and for poorer
city residents in particular, efforts to
introduce water metering have met keen
political resistance in developing
countries. This article examines efforts to
introduce water metering by privatised
utilities in the Argentine provinces. It
highlights the types of political resistance
encountered and the strategies identified
by utilities and political officials to
address household concerns.
Water Metering Provisions in Argentina
under Washington Consensus Reforms
In response to pressure from the national
government, most of the Argentine
provinces chose to “modernise” their
water and sanitation systems during
the 1990s: 11 provinces granted 30-year
management and investment contracts
(concession contracts) to private
operators, and two others established
state-owned private companies that
would be monitored by independent
regulatory agencies.1 Contracts and the
enabling laws establishing regulatory
agencies stipulated very ambitious water
metering targets for the new service
providers in many cases.
Table 1 shows the eight provincial
concessions granted during the 1990s
that had stringent targets. Note that
these contracts typically required
concessionaires to install meters for
between 50 and 100 per cent of their
residential customer base within
the first few years of the contract
or face financial penalties.
Problems of Implementation
Between 10 and 15 years after the start
of the Argentine concession contracts, as
Table 1 indicates, no concessionaire has
met its contractual targets. Only two have
come close to meeting their goals: Aguas
de Corrientes and Servicio de Aguas de
Misiones (SAMSA).2 Importantly, this lack
of progress is observable in concessions
that have been widely regarded as
successful in terms of extending services
to new users, such as Aguas de Salta.
by Alison E. Post,
University of California,
Berkeley The Paradoxical Politics
of Water Metering in
Argentina
1. The contract for the Buenos Aires metropolitan
area was granted by the national government rather
than a provincial government. Three other provincial
concessions were granted after the 1990s: Catamarca,
La Rioja and a contract encompassing one part of
Buenos Aires province.
2. As Table 1 indicates, only one of the eight contracts
was cancelled: the Azurix contract. The rest remained
in place as of January 2009.
3. See the August and September 2004 issues of
El Tribuno, the provincial newspaper for Salta, Argentina.
4. While tariff hikes of 100 per cent in the province
of Tucumán received international attention, more
typical in Argentina were increases of 5-20 per cent
at any one time.Poverty in Focus   August 2009    17
What has stood in the way of
implementation? One might suppose
that tariff systems did not provide
concessionaires with financial incentives
to switch consumers from fixed charges
to metered consumption. In the
Argentine contracts listed above,
however, concessionaires could generally
charge higher tariffs when consumption
was metered and when households
consumed above a certain allotment.
Rather, the main stumbling block has
been consumer resistance. The historically
quiescent population of Santiago del
Estero province, for instance, took to the
streets to march in protest against the
installation of water meters, and secured
a multi-year delay in the metering
programme (Tenti, 2005, p. 165). Meanwhile,
in neighbouring Salta province,
individuals vandalised newly-installed
water meters, staged major protests in
the central city, and voted not to accept
metering at neighbourhood assemblies.3
What prompted these strong public
reactions against meter installation?
Let us start with the obvious explanations.
First, metering was introduced at the
same time as other controversial measures
designed to move utilities to cost-recovery,
including scaled tariff increases, the more
vigorous enforcement of bill payment,
and the “regularisation” of clandestine
connections.4 Initially, regulatory
frameworks for most of the contracts also
required households to pay for the cost
of meters in instalments. Governments
and firms responded to protests sparked
by this second issue by shifting the
financial burden for meter installation
onto the firm or government in most cases.
There were, however, more subtle
reasons why consumers rejected
metering, reasons that stem from
widespread reservations about the
motives of public and private institutions
in societies plagued by corruption.
The fact that different households
paid different rates, for instance,
aroused scepticism; who was to ensure
that meters functioned correctly and
bills were being calculated fairly?
Technical difficulties only contributed
to such doubts. Invisible leaks in
household pipes, for example, could
lead to extremely high monthly
consumption rates. In areas where
companies were unable to provide
constant levels of water pressure,
customers also wondered if they were
paying for air rather than water coming
through their pipes.
Table 1






Aguas de Corrientes S.A.
(Corrientes)a
Aguas de Formosa S.A.
(Formosa)b






















Meters for 100% of customers
by 3rd year of the contract.
Meters for 100% of non-residential
users within 12 months; meters for
50% of residential users within 2 years.
Meters for 100% of non-residential
users within 2 years; meters for 50%
of residential users within 2 years
(except in two villages).
Meters for 20% of households by end
of year 1, 40% by end of year 2,
100% by end of year 5.
Meters for 10% of households by the end
of year 1; by year 2, 30%; by year 3, 50%;
by year 4, 70%, by year 5, 90%.
Meters for 95% of customers
by 2005.
Meters for 40% of households by year 5;
70% by year 10, 100% by year 15.
Meters for 90% of users in Posadas by
year 3; for 90% in Garupá by year 6.
Metering rate for residential
users circa 1997**
88% (9/97 - 8/98)
19% (1997)
0% (11/97 - 8/98)
0% (5/97 - 4/98)
0% (8/98 - 9/98)


















Metering rate in 2003,
2004, 2005, 2006***
Notes: * Not included: concession contracts for Tucumán, Santa Fe, and the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, which had less stringent metering targets; ** Metering rates calculated from
data reported by companies in ENOHSA-COFES (1999); residential users comprised the vast majority of accounts, and consumption by non-residential users was typically metered before
privatisation; *** Metering rates reported by companies from the ADERESA benchmarking project, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; **** Company (SAMSA) records indicate that the metering rate
was only 18.4% at the beginning of the concession. An additional 20% of consumers were billed at metered rates but had non-functioning meters or no meter at all; ***** SAMSA reports
that, as of 2008, the company meters 95% of its consumer base.
Source: a.: Pliego de Bases y Condiciones, Capítulo 10; b.: Pliego de Condiciones Particulares, Anexo V, Parte E; c.: Pliego de Bases y Condiciones, Anexo V, Artículo 14.5; d.: Pliego de Bases
y Condiciones, Anexo XIII, Artículos 1.14, 1.15; e.: Contrato de Concesión, Artículo 4.2.1; f.: Contrato de Concesión, Anexo II, Capítulo III; g.: Contrato de Concesión, Anexo F, Artículo 2.2;
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Political discontent and
popular mobilisation in
Bolivia led to the early
termination of the private
contracts in 2005.
Since the concessionaire
did not comply with the
number of new connections
stipulated in the contract,
the government felt
compelled to demand
termination of the contract.
Ways Forward
The difficulties encountered in the
Argentine provinces highlight
the importance of approaching the
introduction of meters in political
terms; consumer expectations and
scepticism must be anticipated and
addressed pre-emptively. Fortunately,
one can glean some effective strategies
from the Argentine concessions.
 Metered tariff formulas must be clear
and intelligible to consumers when
they read their bills.
 Rates for modest levels of consumption
should be lower than those for higher
levels, and a level of consumption
adequate for modest family living
should cost no more than the fixed-
rate regime.
 Meter installation will meet less
resistance if firms or governments foot
the cost of installation. Users will of
course end up funding meters
through regular tariffs, presuming
the system is not subsidised, but
users are unlikely to see this.
 Utilities can send households bills
containing meter readings for several
months before metered billing is
utilities to expand services and improve
pressure levels in outlying districts with
fewer major new investments in system
capacity. Recent efforts to implement
metering under the Washington
Consensus, however, have faced
significant political resistance.
Future efforts to introduce metering
should be preceded by careful thinking
about political strategy, particularly the
question of how to address longstanding
citizen scepticism about the motives
of public and private institutions.
The aforementioned strategies identified
in the Argentine context may be of use in
dealing with consumer resistance in
other settings.
Asociación de Entes Reguladores de
Agua Potable y Saneamiento de América
Latina (ADERASA) (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).
Ejercicio Anual de Benchmarking.
Processed data.
ENOHSA-COFES (1999). La Cobrabilidad
de los Servicios Sanitarios en Argentina.
Buenos Aires, ENOHSA-COFES.
Tenti, María Mercedes (2005). La Reforma
del Estado Santiagueña: La Gestión política
en los 90’. Santiago del Estero, Argentina:
Ediciones Universidad Católica de Santiago
del Estero.
introduced. This gives individuals
a sense of whether they should
moderate consumption levels before
the new rates come into effect.
 Utilities can schedule meter installation
after stabilising water pressure in given
districts, so as to avoid disputes
about measurement.
 Finally—and most effectively,
according to officials of the Misiones
concession—utilities should
proactively identify households with
abnormal consumption levels before the
introduction of metered billing
and send specialised technicians
to investigate if households have
serious leaks on their property.
According to most contracts,
fixing such leaks is a household’s
responsibility; such proactive efforts
by a utility, however, will help
neutralise the most likely opponents
to metering once it is introduced.
Introducing water metering on a more
widespread basis in developing countries
promises to have numerous positive
effects, especially for poorer city-dwellers
living on the urban fringe. Metering should
lower overall demand, thereby allowing
A “Successful Privatisation”
Was Nationalised in Bolivia.
Why?





corporatised and privatised their water
provision on the grounds that the public
sector lacked capacity to invest in
maintenance and service expansion.
The arguments supporting private
sector participation in the provision of
basic utilities are greater efficiency
and a lower burden on public finances.
Privatisation, therefore, is believed to
improve access to basic services through
large investments in maintenance,
network expansion and excellence in
delivery (regularity, more connections,
higher quality and so on). Governments
would play a regulatory role, setting the
expansion targets and controlling tariffs.
There is scepticism, however, about
whether profit-oriented concessionaires
would really invest in expanding coverage.
Concessionaires will not always expand
the water grid to poor areas due to lack
of market incentives. Private utilities may
not find it profitable to supply slums-
dwellers, for instance. The high incidence
of illegal connections and the low-Poverty in Focus   August 2009    19
1. A caveat in the analysis arises from the fact that
Cochabamba was privatised for a short period of
less than a year in 1999 (see Hailu and Hunt, 2008).
For a detailed escription of the empirical framework
and limitations of the analysis, see Hailu et al. (2009).
2. We calculate a performance index based on
Kakwani’s achievement function. The index is a
non-linear transformation of the original coverage
indicator, taking the starting level into account and
allowing specification of the appreciation of degree
of effort (Kakwani, 1993).
income status of households may hinder
cost recovery and discourage private
investments. Moreover, there is a risk of
agency capture, preventing governments
from fulfilling their regulatory role.
Ascertaining whether privatisation
improves access to utilities is an empirical
matter. Bolivia provides an interesting
example, having privatised the water
utility in two important cities in the last
decade. Water provision in La Paz and
El Alto was privatised between 1997
and 2005. Private participation was
effected through “concession contracts”.
An international water consortium won
the concession in those two cities.
A 30-year contract (1997–2027) was granted
for the operation and maintenance
of, as well as investments in, water
and sewerage provision. The upgraded
infrastructure would remain under state
ownership after the concession period.
In the other two largest Bolivian cities,
water provision remained cooperatively
managed (Santa Cruz) and under public
provision (Cochabamba).1
Political discontent and popular
mobilisation, however, led to the early
termination of the contracts in 2005.
Why were the private concessions ended
prematurely? When the concession
contracts were drawn up, the government
and the company agreed coverage
targets: by 2001, installing 71,752 new
water conections—roughly universal
access in La Paz and 82 per cent coverage
in El Alto. Yet the private provider failed
to meet the agreed targets. In addition,
upward adjustment of tariffs provoked
public outrage. Eventually the
unpopularity of cost recovery and the
failure to meet legally binding targets led
to the termination of the contract.
In what follows we tell an empirical story.
We use data from national household
surveys carried out by Bolivia’s Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica (INE) between 1992
and 2005. We analyse access to water in
the period before and after privatisation
in the cities that privatised water
provision and in those that did not. This
allows us to determine how far the private
provider attempted to push the limits of
private provision and in the process how
far, paradoxically, the poor benefited.
Access to water is considered from three
perspectives: delivery (coverage rate),
equity (concentration of access) and
affordability (water expenditure).
Delivery
The most fundamental indicator for
assessing delivery is the water coverage
rate—a headcount of households with
in-house access to piped water. Access to
the utility is closely related to income:
connection fees are an entry barrier for
the poor, and infrastructure (extended
water grids) barely reaches slums or
informal settlements. Hence the poorest
quintiles of the population usually have
more limited access to piped water.
The analysis shows that in-house
access to water has expanded more
than proportionally in cities with
private provision. In Cochabamba,
access deteriorated in this period,
while in Santa Cruz the coverage rate
remained fairly constant (see Table 1).
Furthermore, the results point to a
positive relationship between having
access to water and living in cities
where the water utility was privatised.
It is true that the cities had different
coverage rates at the start of the
period. The higher the initial coverage,
the more difficult it might be to
expand access further. A performance
index2 accounts for the effort made
by the utility to increase coverage.
Taking that into account also, access
to in-house piped water still seems to
have increased substantially more in
La Paz and El Alto with privatisation
than in the other cities.
Equity
Equity refers to providing all households
with the same level of access to utilities
despite their income status. A policy-
maker could redistribute wealth either
by transferring physical assets from rich
to poor households or by increasing
provision to the poor more than
proportionally. This latter approach
seems to be reasonable in the case
of utility infrastructure.
Access to piped water became more
equitable (deconcentrated) under
the private concessions (see Figure 1).
In 2005, the difference in coverage rates
between the poorest 20 per cent and the
richest 20 per cent of the population fell
from 30 to 4 percentage points in El Alto
and from 15 to 4 percentage points
in La Paz, compared to the period prior
to privatisation. A pro-poor increase in
access to water is especially noticeable
in El Alto. Extending access to the poorest
households in particular led to a sharp
de-concentration in access to water.
An already high coverage rate in the
upper quintiles of the population,
however, does not necessarily imply an
extension of the water supply to lower-
income areas. As mentioned earlier,
private investment lacks market
incentives to serve areas of low
Table 1
Piped Water Coverage Rate (%) in Four Bolivian Cities
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on INE.
* One year before privatisation. ** One year before renationalisation.
1996* 2001 2005**
La Paz 87.9 83.4 97.9 88.6 79.2 98.2 96.6 96.2 100
El Alto 76.2 55.6 85.6 69.4 78.1 87.4 87.8 86.0 90.8
Cochabamba 76.5 63.3 84.7 78.6 58.5 93.1 61.8 25.9 74.2
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Note:  The concentration curves show the distribution of access to water in each city. The lowest quintile (the poorer 20%)
of population in El Alto, who had in 1996 14.6 percent of all water connections, increased its share to 19.5 percent
by the end of the concession period. In a perfect equality world, the bottom 20 percent of population should hold
20 percent of the total water access. As the curves move inwards (toward the equality line), a more equal distribution
of the access to water is observed.
Source: Prepared by the authors based on household survey data released by INE.
purchasing power. Hence the pro-poor
increase in water access in La Paz and
El Alto stemmed mainly from enforcement
of the targets in the concession contract.
The contracts explicitly demanded that
the companies provide services to low-
income areas and, as stated, the target
was to reach very high levels of coverage.
Affordability
Households should not spend more
than 3 percent of their income on water
bills. This is the acceptable affordability
threshold. Although data on household
water expenditure is not available for the
period immediately before privatisation,
we can compare expenditure over 2001
and 2005. Before the concessions in
La Paz and El Alto, a 19 per cent upward
adjustment in water prices was offered
as an inducement to private companies.
In 2001, the first revision of targets
(scheduled every five years after the
concession) allowed a further 12 per cent
increase in water prices.
In a cross-city analysis, as expected,
the poorest income quintiles reveal the
highest incidence of households that
cannot afford water. In 2001, the share
of households that spent more than 3
per cent of their income on water bills
was as high as 64 and 78 per cent for
the poorest quintiles in non-privatised
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz,
respectively. Throughout the period,
moreover, average household water
expenditure, by income quintiles, was
persistently higher in these cities than
in those with privatised provision.
The burden of water expenditure was
heaviest for poor households in Santa
Cruz, which spent on average 8.8 per
cent of their income on water in 2001,
and 5.9 per cent in 2005. The poorest
quintile in La Paz and Cochabamba
also had a heavy burden, respectively
spending an average of 4.7 and 4.6
percent of their income in 2001. In 2005,
however, the poorest in La Paz could
afford water, spending on average 2.6
per cent of income, while Cochabamba’s
poorest households still spent above
that threshold on water.
Concluding Remarks
From a delivery perspective, the network
expanded more in the cities where
provision had been privatised than in
the others. Of course, we cannot tell
whether this would have been the
outcome in La Paz and El Alto if there
had been no private intervention. Indeed,
household income has risen over the
years, which would naturally lead to
an increase in access to water because
of the affordability of connection fees.
Nonetheless, an interesting feature
of these cities is the large, pro-poor
character of water services expansion.
The explicit five-year expansion targets
imposed by the concession contracts
seem to have played a critical role in
the high growth of new connections.
Apart from the expansion of access, the
price of water services and households’
capacity to afford water must also be
taken into account. It is usually accepted
that households would spend more on
water if the utility were private.
That is not necessarily what we have
found in a cross-city comparison in the
period of privatisation. It is true that,
before privatisation, water tariffs are
adjusted so as to offer an attractive cost
recovery outlook for prospective firms.
In this case, households suffer a one-off
welfare loss. But quite a large proportion
of poor households in the cities where
the utility is public or cooperatively
managed could not afford water either.
Hence affordability seems to be a
problem in these cities as well.
The chief message of this analysis
is that privatisation contracts not
always fare well in poor countries.
The concessions in La Paz and El Alto
failed. Though the poorest households
had better access than before, pricePoverty in Focus   August 2009    21
Of those that earned less
than the minimum salary in
2007, for instance, only 69
per cent had access to piped
water supply, whereas 94
per cent of those earning
more than 20 times the
minimum salary had access.
Despite its abundant natural and
human resources and its great potential for
economic development, Brazil faces many
social and economic challenges. There are
of course many public policies available,
but access to adequate water supply
should be part of any initiative to that
end. The following statistics, compiled from
the National Household Sample Surveys
(PNAD) in several years, bear that out:
 About a third of households with
access to piped water supply in
Brazil are in the rich Southeast region,
whereas about half of the population
without access to water is in the poor
Northeast region.
 About 51 per cent of households
without access are in rural, isolated
urban or non-urbanised areas.
 The illiteracy rate among individuals
without access is relatively very high,
about 10 percentage points higher
than among those with access.
 Individuals without access have
appreciably fewer years of study
than those with access. A striking 31
per cent of those without access have
less than one year of study, and more
than 23 per cent have only between
one and three years of study.
The characteristics associated with
households and individuals without
access are consistent with those usually
found in low-income families. Moreover,
even though access to water supply has
increased significantly in the recent past,
its distribution is considerably skewed.
Access by households in the lower
income brackets is clearly substandard
(see Figure 1). Of those that earned less
than the minimum salary in 2007, for
instance, only 69 per cent had access to
piped water supply, whereas 94 per cent
of those earning more than 20 times the
minimum salary had access.
It stands to reason, then, that further
increases in coverage of water supply
Private Sector
Participation and Access
to Water Supply in Brazil
by Andre Rossi de Oliveira,
Department of Economics, Portland State
University and Center for Studies on
Market Regulation, University of Brasilia
Note: MS = minimum salary, which was equivalent to about US$200 in June 2007.
Source: National Household Sample Survey (PNAD).
increases created a negative perception
among consumers. Spending on
infrastructure and service provision
reaches the limits of profitability.
The company could no longer exploit the
ability to pay and engage in cost recovery.
Furthermore, since the concessionaire
did not comply with the number of new
connections stipulated in the contract,
the government felt compelled to
demand termination of the contract.
Hailu, Degol and Portia Hunt. (2008). “Utility
Provision: Contract Design in the Interest
of the Poor”, IPC-IPG Policy Research Brief
No. 10.  International Policy Centre for
Inclusive Growth. Brasilia.
Hailu, Degol, Rafael Osorio and Raquel
Tsukada (2009). “Privatisation and
Renationalisation: What Went Wrong in
Bolivia’s Water Sector?” IPC-IG Working
Paper No. 58. International Policy Centre for
Inclusive Growth. Brasilia.
Kakwani, Nanak (1993).
“Performance in Living Standards:
An International Comparison”, Journal of
Development Economics 41, pp. 307–336.22 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
techniques to data from the National
Sanitation Information System (SNIS).1
This includes information on several
technical indicators related to water
services over the period 1995–2003
for a large number of municipalities.
The control variables in our model are
GDP per capita, productivity, investment,
and cost variables that try to capture
economies of scale and density, besides
auxiliary dummies. According to our
results, private provision increases
access to water supply by more than 26
per cent compared to public provision.
More importantly, the impact of private
provision is higher in the lower income
deciles, indicating that the benefits of
higher access rates due to privatisation
accrue mostly to poorer municipalities.
These results, however, do not take
into account possible “inertia” effects.
This means that our results might be
spurious if private provision were
disproportionately introduced in
municipalities that had higher access
rates at the outset. To address this issue,
we use a different dataset that allows
us to compare municipalities before
and after the privatisation of water
supply services.
The database is from the Brazil Human
Development Atlas (HAD), made available
by the United Nations Development
Programme in Brazil. This database
consolidates socioeconomic data available
in the 1991 and 2000 Brazilian
Demographic Censuses.
We use a difference-in-differences
method to compare the change in
outcome in the treatment group before
and after the treatment (here, privatisation),
to the change in outcome in the
control group (here, the municipalities
that did not privatise their water services).
By comparing changes, it is possible
to isolate the effects of treatment from
other factors affecting the outcome.
As in the previous estimations, this
method generates a positive and
significant estimated coefficient for
private provision, confirming the
positive impact of privatisation on
the population’s access to water services.
It is safe to say, therefore, that private
provision has led to an improvement
in access to water services in Brazil, and
that this effect was more pronounced
in municipalities at the bottom of the
income (GDP) per capita spectrum. These
results allow us to conjecture that low-
income households have benefited the
most in that respect, since Brazil has a
relatively high coverage rate in water
provision (compared to other developing
countries) and higher-income families are
usually the first to get access.
Part of this result might be attributable
to investment obligations assumed by
private operators at the time they were
granted their concessions. Total scheduled
investments by private operators until
the end of their concession contracts
(between 2025 and 2030) amount to
R$3.38 billion (about U$1.54 billion), of
which R$1.10 billion (about U$500 million)
or 32.7 per cent had been disbursed by
the end of 2004. Disbursements to the
end of 2009 are estimated at half the
total value of investments.
Additionally, privately owned or managed
companies in Brazil generally invest more
than public companies or governments,2
which may be one of the reasons
for the relative success they have had in
increasing access rates (see Figures 2–4).
1. Published by the Programme for the Modernisation
of the Sanitation Sector (PMSS) of the Brazilian
Ministry of Cities.
2. In Brazil, these can be grouped into autarky,
direct public administration, and publicly owned
or managed companies.
services should mainly benefit poor
families. In what follows, we suggest that
private sector participation in the water
sector has been successful in doing just
that, and therefore should be considered
a viable alternative to public provision.
To a great extent, water supply services in
Brazil still reflect the policies established
under the National Sanitation Plan
(Planasa) in 1971, which favoured large-
scale investments and cross-subsidy
schemes. The sector is dominated by
regional companies that serve a large
number of municipalities and have
extensive networks. Since the mid 1990s,
however, many municipalities have
chosen to outsource the provision of water
services to privately owned or operated
companies. In urban areas, there were
about 1,350 water and sewage entities
in 2006, of which 32 had been privatised.
In the North region of Brazil, Manaus,
the capital of the state of Amazonas, and
Novo Progresso in the state of Pará are
the only cities where water is supplied
by private companies. In the Middle West
there are private enterprises in the states
of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and
Tocantins. The Southeast has most of the
private experiences, mainly in the states
of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, but
also in Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais.
In the South, the states of Paraná and
Santa Catarina have tried the private
provision of sanitation services.
Private ventures undertaken so far differ
considerably in terms of financing
and tariff structures. In some cases,
companies subscribed the totality
of their initial capital, while in others
relatively sophisticated financing schemes
were set up, including equity and debt.
Tariff structures are in line with those
adopted in the past by the sector,
based on minimum consumption rates
and increased block-rate tariffs, and
differentiated according to user groups.
In some cases, price-cap regulation
was implemented. Concessions are
the contractual instrument of choice
in most cases.
In order to evaluate quantitatively
the impact of private provision on
access, we first apply panel data
 It is safe to say,
therefore, that private
provision has led to an
improvement in access
to water services
in Brazil, and that
this effect was more
pronounced in
municipalities at
the bottom of the
income (GDP)
per capita spectrum.Poverty in Focus   August 2009    23
There is evidence that a greater presence
of private undertakings in the Brazilian
water sector can be beneficial—not only
because the sector has a great demand
for investments that cannot come
entirely from the public sector, but also
because private provision can improve
access for the poor when under
contractual obligations.
This potential greater participation
on the part of the private sector would
have a wider social impact if it came
with strings attached. For instance,
it could be made to serve poor customers
by placing emphasis on tariff design,
so that low-income families were
targeted more accurately.
There are cases of private companies,
such as Citágua in Cachoeiro de
Itapemirim (Espírito Santo state), that
actively engage in tariff policies designed
for low-income families, usually in
cooperation with the municipalities.
Citágua has a joint programme with the
city that gives waivers to low-income
families with up to 10 cubic meters of
consumption. Families have to register
with the municipal department of social
works in order to be eligible.
In summary, the positive outcomes in
Brazil are related to contract design,
the size and location of municipalities
and the sophistication of their staff.
Most contracts stressed investment
obligations, something relatively easy
to monitor. The municipalities are not
large in size and are located in relatively
prosperous areas. Their staff have
also the capacity to enforce contracts.
Political, social and cultural institutions
or norms to monitor the private sector
should also be fostered. Currently they are
almost non-existent. Municipalities and
state agencies are the only entities in
charge of enforcing concession contracts.
Finally, universal service obligations, now
absent from most concession contracts,
could be negotiated with or even
imposed on private providers. 
Oliveira, Andre Rossi de (2008).
“Social Policy, Regulation and Private
Sector Water Supply: The Case of Brazil”,
in N. Prasad (ed.), Social Policies and Private
Sector Participation in Water Supply: Beyond
Regulation. Houndmills, Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 126–148.
Note: Local operators are those that provide water service only to the municipality where they are located.
Source: PMSS – National Sanitation Information System (SNIS).
Note: Microregional operators are those that provide services to more that one municipality, normally in small numbers
and adjacent to each other, including inter-municipal consortia.
Source: PMSS – National Sanitation Information System (SNIS).
Note: Regional providers are those that serve several municipalities, including the state water and
sanitation companies (CESBs).
Source: PMSS – National Sanitation Information System (SNIS).24 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
The Brazilian government
has therefore decided
to supply electricity to all
those living in rural areas.
Brazil’s federal
government has begun
several initiatives to create
incentives and obligations
for concessionaires to invest
in rural electrification,
and to supply the service
to low-income consumers.
According to the World Bank, some
1.6 billion people in the world, more than
a quarter of humanity, have no access to
electricity and 2.4 billion people rely on
wood, charcoal or dung as their principal
source of energy for cooking and
heating. Two and a half million women
and children die each year from the
indoor pollution from cooking fires.
In Brazil, the lowest levels of access to
electricity are in the North and Northeast
regions. It is no coincidence that
these regions have the worst Human
Development Indices (HDI) of all Brazilian
regions, a fact that reveals a close
relationship between living conditions and
access to electricity in Brazil.
2 Additionally,
access to electricity is more of a problem
in rural areas than in urban areas.
Rural households with the lowest
monthly incomes are also those with the
lowest rates of electric lighting. The 2000
Brazilian census (IBGE, 2001) shows that
64 per cent of households without such
lighting have a monthly family income
of less than two minimum wages (one
minimum wage in Brazil is equivalent
to US$194). Some 89 per cent of such
households have a monthly family
income below three minimum wages.
The Brazilian government has therefore
decided to supply electricity to all those
living in rural areas. That decision stems
from the perception that energy is
central to reducing poverty and hunger,
improving health, increasing literacy and
education, and improving the living
conditions of women and children.
Programmes for Access to
Electricity in Brazil
Brazil’s federal government has begun
several initiatives to create incentives and
obligations for concessionaires to invest
in rural electrification, and to supply the
service to low-income consumers.
Under the aegis of the MME, the state-
owned electricity utility, Eletrobras,
launched the Light in the Countryside
programme to finance electricity access
for 1 million new rural consumers over
a three-year period, focusing exclusively
on grid extension and contributing to
Brazil’s national plan for rural development.
The Light in the Countryside programme
was ended by the federal government in
mid 2004, and its goals were incorporated
into an initiative called Light for
Everyone. Today, the latter is the
government’s main instrument to
provide universal access to electricity.
Table1 shows the increase in access to
electricity in Brazil between 2004 and
2008, and the number of households and
population served by the programme.
Table 2 gives recent figures for
the Amazon region.
It is important to note the higher rate of
electricity access in Pará than in Amazonas,
since in the latter state the rainforest is a
natural barrier to the extension of the
electricity grid. In this case decentralised
supply (such as through renewable
sources) is fundamental to increasing
energy access.
In the Amazon region there is also a
fund, the Fuel Consumption Account
(CCC from its initials in Portuguese),
which began in 1993. Diesel oil is
subsidised through this fund with
resources collected from electricity
consumers. The CCC is financed by
special taxes on all electricity bills for
households in the interlinked system
outside the Amazon region.3
Resolution 245/99 of the National
Agency for Electrical Energy determined
the conditions and timeframes for
implementing projects in isolated
electricity systems that totally or partially
substitute for oil-fired thermoelectric
by Suani Teixeira Coelho,
Patricia Guardabassi, Beatriz. A. Lora
and José Goldemberg,
Brazilian Reference Center on Biomass




1. This paper is based on the following studies prepared
by CentroClima and CENBIO for the Global Network
on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD):
“Energy Access III” (October, 2005) and “Renewable
Energy Technologies II Comparison Report” (May, 2007).
2. Inhabitants without access (per cent): Brazil = 5.5;
North = 17.6; Northeast = 11.1; Middle West = 3.9;
South = 3.1; and Southeast = 1.9 (MME, 2003).
3. The Brazilian Interlinked System (Sistema Interligado
Nacional, SIN) comprises companies from the South,
Southeast, Middle West, Northeast and North. Only
3.4 per cent of the electricity production capacity of the
country is outside the SIN, in small and isolated systems
located mainly in the Amazon region. See the Operador
Nacional do Sistema Elétrico (ONS) at: <http://
www.ons.org.br/conheca_sistema/o_que_e_sin.aspx>.Poverty in Focus   August 2009    25
improve living conditions and guarantee
the operation and maintenance of the
RET system.
The Programme for Energy Development
in States and Municipalities (PRODEEM), a
federal initiative that began in December
1994, was coordinated by the Ministry of
Mines and Energy (MME). PRODEEM’s goal
was to expand access in Brazil’s isolated
regions that are not currently served
by the conventional electricity grid,
mainly using photovoltaic systems
and locally available renewable sources,
thereby fostering self-sustainable social
and economic development.
The most important achievements of
this programme are the electrification
of schools (Brazil has about 50,000
schools without electricity) and water
pumping in areas subject to droughts.
generation (diesel generators).
The scheme will be in effect
until May 2013.
Table 3 shows that in 1991,
before the introduction
of the CCC, 87 per cent of
Brazilian households—97
per cent in urban areas and
49 per cent in rural areas—
had access to electricity,
while the average in the
northern region was 92
per cent of households in
urban areas and 54 per cent
in rural areas. Almost 17 per
cent of Brazil’s population live in rural
areas, but rural output accounts for just
6 per cent of the country’s GDP.
In 2002, the rate of access to electricity
in isolated systems was still quite low
compared to the countrywide figures
for Brazil. Moreover, access in urban
areas was substantially higher than in
the countryside, despite the CCC policy.
Nonetheless, the increase in access for
isolated communities is evident by
comparing the figures for 1991 with
those of 2002.
Renewable Technology for
Poverty Alleviation in Brazil
While supply structures similar to those
in industrialised countries have been
established in many urban-industrial
agglomerations in developing countries,
rural areas in the developing world
remained under-supplied. The
expansion of grids into remote areas
with a low population density soon
comes up against its limits: long
transmission lines, lower average
purchasing power, lower density of
connections and smaller loads mean
that conventional energy utilities must
operate such grid-based supply
at a loss. This is the reason for the
exceptionally low rate of electrification
in many developing countries.
Poor communities in isolated regions are
far from the distribution grid and cannot
afford fuel supply; often, they use diesel
generators to produce electricity. Hence
the introduction of renewable energy
technologies (RETs) must consider the
profile of the community for the purposes
of supporting commercial activities.
These activities could create local jobs,
Source:  MME.
North 8,265 41,009 90,067 77,220 99,547 316,108 1,580,540
Northeast 27,157 200,853 271,529 201,141 235,381 936,061 4,680,305
Southeast 24,229 67,342 151,457 59,817 39,413 342,258 1,711,290
South 4,218 36,913 42,896 33,743 33,363 151,333 756,665
Middle West 6,130 31,929 34,064 25,956 33,523 131,602 658,010




Population 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Table 1
 Annual Expansion of Access to Electricity Under the Light for All Programme
Table 2
Expansion of Access to Electricity under the Light for Everyone Programme,
Amazon Region Only
Source:  MME.
Amazonas State Pará State
Number of households (2008) 4,694 68,895
Number of households 23,158 209,044
(accumulated 2004–2008)
Number of inhabitants (2008) 23,470 344,475
Number of inhabitants 115,790 1,045,220
(accumulated 2004–2008)
Table 3
Electricity Access in 1991–2002 in Urban and Rural Areas of Brazil
and its Northern Region (Isolated systems)
Source:  IBGE (1992) and MME.
 Coverage (%)
Urban Rural Total
State 1991 2002 1991 2002 1991 2002
Acre 95 98.5 13 32.6 70 80.4
Amazonas 96 97.8 16 27.2 79 85.4
Amapá 94 99.3 42 52.0 89 95.6
Pará 91 97.6 37 39.0 71 82.2
Rondônia 90 98.5 20 58.8 68 85.7
Roraima 97 98.9 30 42.4 82 88.6
Region average 92 98.5 54 48.6 75 88.1
Brazil 97 98.8 49 73.2 87 94.826 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
At the beginning of 2003 the MME
decided to restructure PRODEEM, and in
2005 it was incorporated into an initiative
called Light in the Countryside.
In Brazil there are many small and
medium-sized communities that are
isolated from the urban centres and
are not connected to the utility. Hence
they depend on fossil fuel for electricity
production, particularly in the Amazon
region. But several of these places have
favourable conditions for the use of
renewable energy sources, such as
photovoltaic (PV), small hydropower
(SHP), biomass and so forth.
Given these conditions and the new
rules for universalisation of electricity
services, it can be expected that more
generation systems will be installed
using local energy sources in the
not too distant future.
For remote villages, PV, SHP and biomass
systems are the best options. Brazil’s
intense solar radiation favours PV
technology and biomass, circumstances
that allowed the development of such
pilot plants. But PV systems still have
high installation costs and are feasible
only when other systems are not
available. Thus the development of PV
solar energy in Brazil is recent and its
contribution as an alternative energy
source is still tiny.
In these isolated communities, the
costs of transporting fuel (diesel oil)
to the community make the fuel price
double that in urban areas, while
bioenergy production costs are lower
than for diesel oil. Besides transport
costs there are environmental pollution
risks during transportation, such as
the danger of fuel spillage. Electricity
generation from biomass is appropriate
in these conditions (Goldemberg and
Coelho, 2003).
Biomass is a good option for
decentralised electricity generation.
The most used forms are agricultural
residues, wood residues, vegetable oils
and biogas. Vegetable oil pilot plants
match the conditions of users, resources,
technologies and capacities. But
constraints arising from the law
regulating the CCC make it hard
to secure the benefits of the fund.
In the Amazon region there are projects
to test and implement demonstrations
units of a conventional diesel engine
that has been adapted to operate with
palm oil. CENBIO (http://cenbio.iee.usp.br)
has developed two pilot plants using palm
oil in adapted engines in Pará state, with
quite significant results.
RETs, in addition to their undisputed
ecological advantages, are often the most
economical means of supplying energy
to remote and thinly populated areas.
The typically decentralised renewable
energy systems using local energy sources
can be easily adapted in size and capacity
to meet a modest demand, and thus are
especially suitable for overcoming energy
poverty in rural areas.
Renewable energy installations are
therefore already contributing to the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
from the energy sector, albeit on a
very modest scale. Many long-term
projections predict that renewable
energy will play a major role in the
global energy supply in the second
half of the twenty-first century.
Despite these advantages, the
dissemination of technologies using
renewable energy sources has not yet
acquired the desired momentum.
Projects to spread renewable energies,
particularly in developing countries,
must overcome several obstacles:
1. Even RETs that are competitive from a
business management viewpoint
must surmount the hurdle of the
high initial investment costs. Lack of
security makes loans hard to obtain,
especially in rural areas.
2. In many places, fair competitive
conditions have to be established
before markets for new RETs can be
developed. Experience in Germany
has shown that this goal cannot
be met until an appropriate
economic policy framework and an
environmentally sound regulatory
framework have been created, and
until specific promotional measures
have been implemented.
3. In many regions, RET supply
structures are inadequate. Market
development is hampered by a
shortage of qualified suppliers,
rudimentary distribution channels, and
inadequate service and maintenance.
Nonetheless, in recent years there
have been decisive improvements
in the conditions for expanding the
use of sustainable energy systems in
developing countries. Renewable energy
encompasses a number of sources and
technologies at different stages of
development and maturity.
Generally speaking, many of the
technologies have become mature
over the last decade; they are no longer
curiosities for a dedicated few, but
have become big business. Large global
companies have entered the markets
for wind, solar and biomass technologies,
and the traditional finance community
is gradually mainstreaming renewable
energy into its lending portfolios.
In this context, RET can play a significant
role in increasing the energy supply,
mainly in remote regions, since adequate
policies are being implemented to
overcome the barriers discussed here.
Such policies should include special
incentives to local utilities for RET,
including appropriate capacity building
for operation and maintenance, as well
as economic subsidies. 
Goldemberg J. and S. T. Coelho (2003).
“Renewable Energy – Traditional Biomass
vs. Modern Biomass”, Energy Policy 32 (6),
pp. 711–714.
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Amostragem por Domicílios – PNAD.
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An inadequate and
unreliable electricity











The privatisation of public utilities
remains a controversial topic in
the policy arena. In many parts
of the developing world, privatisations
designed to improve efficiency and cost
recovery have often been associated with
large price increases that have caused
enormous social and political tensions
(Birdsall and Nellis, 2003). In Africa the
infrastructure privatisation process has
been more sluggish (Estache, 2005), but
slowly emerging evidence on the effects
of reforms is hinting at similar problems.
Distributional impact analysis applied in
Senegal and Mali provides useful
information for future reforms.
An inadequate and unreliable electricity
supply is one of the most serious
constraints on economic growth in
many Sub-Saharan African countries. The
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and the countries’ poverty reduction
strategies call for increasing electricity
coverage by 2015. Reaching this goal
and meeting demand will require
massive investments, which will have to
be accompanied by reforms in the sector.
When a utility is privatised, it might be
necessary to raise the price of electricity
in order to generate the funds needed
to reach the coverage target (capital
expenses) set out in the poverty
reduction strategy, as well as to cover
operating expenses. Raising prices,
however, has implications for economic
activity in many sectors of the economy
and for the welfare of households. In the
past, public electricity companies have
run deficits and governments have cross-
subsidised electricity consumers.
In this article we apply a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model to
analyse the impact of pricing reforms in
the electricity sector in Senegal and Mali.
As suggested by Parker and Kirkpatrick
(2005), privatisation is ideally assessed
using CGE models when the goal is
to verify the impact of relative price
changes on different markets and
socioeconomic groups. Macroeconomic
assessment is also important because
utility reforms typically affect other
economic markets such as labour,
investments and savings, which can have
a significant effect on poverty and on the
welfare of the poor. In recent years, these
models with micro modules have been
used extensively in distributional impact
analysis in developing countries. What
does the evidence tell us?
Reform in Mali
Mali’s public utility operator, Energie
du Mali (EDM), was established in 1960,
shortly after independence, with capital
from the Malian government and the
French Development Agency. It offered
both water and electricity services.
Initially, EDM operated small diesel-fired
generating plants in Bamako and several
secondary cities. The cost of producing
electricity was very high, which
encouraged the Malian government
to develop hydro power through the
construction of three plants. As a public
utility, EDM suffered from the same
problems that afflicted other African
utilities, including mismanagement
and political interference.
In 1986, EDM adopted a performance
contract to try to improve operations but
the process was disrupted by political
instability. In 1994, the government
solicited bids to manage the utility.
The international competition was
won by a French-Canadian consortium
including (SAUR, Hydro-Québec and EDF).
Each member of the consortium was
responsible for functions at EDM.
The contract went well for the first year
or two, after which relationships between
by Luc Savard and Dorothée Boccanfuso,
Department of Economics, Université
de Sherbrooke; and Antonio Estache,
European Centre for Advanced
Research in Economics and Statistics,
Free University of Brussels
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the partners and the Malian board of
directors deteriorated, and the contract
was cancelled in March 1998.
In 2000, the Malian government prepared
a 20-year concession contract, which was
won by SAUR (the government retained
ownership of 40 per cent). Under this
contract, the operator would be required
to increase coverage from 80,000 to
300,000 electricity customers and, in
urban centres, to increase access
from 34 to 97 per cent by 2020.
The associated investment needs were
about 20 billion CFA francs per year.
The contract specified a formula for tariff
adjustments until a regulator, created by
the same reform, could begin to enforce
a price-cap approach. The Ministry of
Mines, Energy and Water retained
responsibility for the technical
supervision of EDM.
Reform in Senegal
During the first attempt to reform the
electricity utility, a consortium assumed
full management in January 1999.
In September 2000, just 18 months after
the privatisation, the new government
of Senegal bought back the consortium’s
share of the utility. In the second
attempt, the consortium that won
the tender refused to complete the
deal, leading to another failure.
The pricing practices of Senegal’s
electricity utility, Senelec, are quite
standard. Prices are differentiated by
voltage: users of higher voltages are billed
the highest price, and the price drops with
the voltage. Since March 2002, various
pricing schemes have been implemented
for specific clients. Tariffs are relatively
high by West African standards. Proposed
changes in Senelec’s prices must also be
authorised by an administrative process
before taking effect.
With respect to investment, the three-
year public investment programmes for
2000/02 and 2002/04 foresaw investments
amounting to 8 per cent of the country’s
total productive investment. The plan
confirmed the government’s intention
to increase the supply of electricity.
Other goals of the investment were to
increase efficiency in production, improve
the institutional framework for
production and distribution, promote
regional cooperation, and raise the rate
of electrification in rural areas. Despite
two failed attempts at privatisation, the
government reiterated its will to privatise
Senelec. To date, progress towards the
chief goal of the proposed reform—to
increase the supply of electricity and the
share of the population with access
to it—has been modest.
Findings of the Distributional
Impact Analysis
The impact analysis of electricity price
increases and compensating schemes to
poor households was performed for the
two countries. The first important finding
of price increases (ranging from 10 per
cent to 45 per cent) is their relatively
small distributional impact. The small
negative impact is promising since
compensating policies are financially
feasible and this situation should help
implement price increases.
The three main explanations for these
results are: the relatively small extent
of the electricity network (including
household and non-household
consumers); the very small portion
of poor households connected to the
network; and the relatively high prices
of electricity before the reforms. This
situation is very different from that in
many Latin American countries and
centrally planned economies in Europe.
Original prices were in the ranges of or
just below the average tariffs in countries
of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Our cost-recovery simulations clearly
produce positive effects for the electricity
utility in both countries, but negative
ones for government, households and
firms. The compensatory direct cash
transfer/direct subsidy programme1
for poor households directly affected
by higher power prices—for those
connected to the grid—attenuates
the negative effect.
However, the negative general
equilibrium effect on factor payments
(labour, land and capital) overrides the
positive general equilibrium effect of
the goods and services price decreases;
hence other households are negatively
affected by those scenarios. It is
important to highlight that the cash
transfer programme is relatively cheap
because so few of the poor are presently
connected to the grid.
These findings highlight the importance
of taking into account the general
equilibrium effect of proposed reforms
in order to fully capture their impact
on poverty and inequality. Few poor
households are connected to the
electricity grid. Moreover, few of the
poorest households are likely to benefit
from early extensions of the network.
Thus it is not surprising that increases
in power prices have little direct effect
on most poor households, whereas a
much larger group will be affected by
the general equilibrium effects of the
increases. In both countries, however,
the biggest losers are the poor
households not connected to the
power grid, because unconnected
households receive no transfers but
suffer from the general equilibrium
effects of the price increases.
Analyses similar to that presented here
can be very useful in policy-making
by illuminating the paths by which
the effects of reforms are transmitted
to the poor. It is also possible to
measure the strength of those effects,
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effective compensatory policies for
groups disproportionately affected
by the reforms.
Reforms of the electricity sector should
include an aggressive programme to
extend the network and increase the
access of the poor. Additionally, because
the general equilibrium effects on the poor
can be clearly negative, it is important to
explore alternative targeting policies to
compensate the poor—not only for the
1. Both types of transfer programme are equivalent
in the model, since we assume zero management
cost of the cash transfer programme. The direct subsidy
programme would consist of maintaining the price
of electricity constant for poor households.
direct effects of price increases, but also
for negative general equilibrium effects
of needed reforms. 
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Women spend several hours a
day performing domestic chores and
caring for other household members.
In developing countries, the burden of
domestic activities is intensified by the
lack of basic infrastructure, such as access
to water and electricity. The time spent on
domestic chores is not remunerated and
it represents significant forgone income
for women. Infrastructure provision,
such as access to indoor piped water
or community-provided services,
potentially reduces women’s time
burden. The saving includes time spent
on loading, unloading and purifying
water, and on walking to and from the
water source. Testing for rural women in
Ghana, access to water infrastructure (in
the community or the household) seems
to be significantly related to a decrease
in their total working time.
Women’s income poverty in developing
countries is usually exacerbated by time
poverty. Releasing time constraints would
enable women to engage in productive
activities (enter the labour market),
dedicate more time to other domestic
activities (such as childbearing or caring
for elderly household members), pursue
education or have a little leisure (which
may also be used for improving health).
Furthermore, access to safe water improves
overall household living conditions
through its associated benefits, such as
reducing waterborne diseases, lowering
infant mortality and preventing the
threat of violent aggression towards
women on their way to the water
sources, which are often located
some distance from their homes.
Thus far the literature has, however, not
presented much empirical evidence on the
relationship between infrastructure and
access to labour markets. One example is
Ilahi and Grimard (2000), which show that
in rural Pakistan, poor infrastructure (water
access) reduces the time that women
devote to market-oriented activities and
increases women’s total work burden.
Other studies only argue that women
are more likely to be time-poor than
men (e.g., Bardasi and Wodon, 2006, for
Guinea). Coulombe and Wodon (2008)
found that access to infrastructure does
not significantly affect the total amount
of hours women work in Ghana,
thus suggesting that time saved from
domestic work due to infrastructure
provision might be used for
remunerated activities.
To contribute to this debate and provide
some additional empirical evidence we
investigate the effect on women’s time
use of providing households with basic
by Joana Costa, Degol Hailu,
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infrastructure. More specifically, we
analyse how access to piped water
influences women’s allocation of time
between paid (labour market) and unpaid
activities (domestic chores and leisure)
in rural Ghana.
The Theory
Studies of time allocation are often
based on Becker’s (1965) utility model,
whereby households combine time and
market-purchased goods to produce
commodities that comprise their utility
functions. A household maximises utility
in line with the commodities and leisure
time consumed: its problem is deciding
on the consumption level and time
allocated to each activity (water
production, market labour, household
activities and leisure). This is constrained
by its available income and a daily
time endowment.
One or few household members usually
fetch water. The household first decides
whether the individual will collect water
or not, and then decides how many
hours will be spent on this activity.
Similarly, for the time women spend in
the paid market, there is first a decision
about entering the job market or not,
and then a decision about how many
hours to work.
Using data from the Ghana Living
Standards Survey, Round Four (1998–1999),
we analyse a sample of 2,858 women
between 25 and 59 years old living
in 190 rural communities. Four models
are estimated, with a view to assessing
the determinants of women’s time
allocation in the activities of fetching
water, domestic work, market work
and total work.
Evidence from the Data
In Ghana there is a clear different pattern
of time use among men and women
(see Figure 1). We observe both a gender-
based division of labour and a heavier
time burden on women. Unpaid activities
(collecting water and domestic chores) are
intensive in women’s work time, while
paid activities are intensive in men’s
work time. About 82.8 per cent of men
do not fetch water at all, and only
14.5 per cent of them spend between
0 and 5 hours per week fetching water.
In contrast, 66 per cent of women
fetch water, and the majority of them
spend up to 15 hours a week doing so.
This labour division and specialisation
may imply efficiency gains for the
household and, therefore, optimal
household behaviour. Nevertheless,
women as individuals have less control
over the household assets (less economic
autonomy) and a higher workload.
Figure 1 shows that the total work time
(domestic plus market work) is much
higher for women. For instance, 19.3
per cent of women work more than 112
hours a week, while for men a proportion
ten times smaller does the same.
Some 79.1 per cent of men in rural Ghana
spend time on domestic work, but 61.6
per cent of men spend less than 20 hours
a week doing so. On the other hand,
96.5 per cent of women spend time
on domestic work, and 81.8 per cent
of total women spend more than
20 hours a week. Interestingly, despite
the heavy domestic workload, 80 per
cent of women also spend some time
on market work, which includes any
kind of income-generating activity
(even simple home-produced goods).
The data shows that domestic work
and fetching water are responsibilities
that fall mainly on women. Our next
step is to investigate how water
provision might determine women´s
time use. We use econometric models
to test the relationship between having
water infrastructure and the time womenPoverty in Focus   August 2009    31
spend on fetching water, domestic
work, market activities and total
time worked. There may be selection
processes involved in deciding
whether to collect water or not, as
well as whether to enter the labour
market or not. A Heckman procedure
corrects for this sample selection
bias. Almost all women perform
domestic work, so there seems to be
no selection process for this activity.
For this, and for the model of total
time worked, we apply ordinary
least squares, regressing the time
allocated to each activity in a set
of control characteristics.
Access to water is defined according to
the household’s distance from the main
source of drinking water. A household
has indoor access to water if it is at
zero distance from the water source.
The community-level infrastructure is
measured according to the percentage
of households that have piped water as
the main source of drinking water. If they
amount to more than 50 per cent, then
the community has access to water.
Results
Results for the determinants of the time
spent fetching water did not present any
surprise. As expected, community per
capita income has a negative effect on
the time spent fetching water. This means
that living in a richer neighbourhood
increases the probability of having
piped water.
If a woman’s household has no access
to the network, living in a community
where more than half of her neighbours
are connected to the utility means
that there is a lower probability of
fetching water from afar (it is likely
that other households would resell
water from their taps or simply let her
fetch it from there). As expected, as the
distance to the water source increases,
the time spent fetching water also
increases, at a decreasing rate.
In the analysis of women’s time spent
on domestic chores, lower education and
having children increases women’s time
burden. Women living in a community
with access to water, however, spend less
time on domestic activities. The results
are also robust for the distance to the
water source: those living closer to the
source spend significantly less time
on domestic activities.
Determinants of women´s time
dedicated to labour market presented
interesting patterns. Women who are
heads of households or spouses of
the heads are more likely to enter the
labour market, though spouses work
fewer hours.
Small children constrain women from
engaging in market-oriented activities,
while older children have a positive
influence on the probability of women
carrying out paid work. Living in
a community with access to water
reduces the probability of women
entering the labour market, while
living further from the water source
does not seem to influence the
probability of entering that market.
This does imply, however, longer
working hours for those women
who have already decided to engage
in income-oriented activities.
A possible explanation for this result
is the presence of a market for water,
fostered by long distances to the water
source. Greater distances discourage
households from engaging in water
collection once that activity implies a
greater time cost. Households would
have the alternative of buying water
instead of collecting it, and women
would dedicate more time to the
activities in which they are already
engaged (such as paid work for those
in the labour market, or leisure).
In the case of a market for water,
if households are to buy it, prices
may increase with longer distances
to the water source. Higher income is
then necessary, so women would
work for longer hours, although the
income generated does not represent
a rise in household wellbeing.
In summary, when assessing
the overall hours worked, water
infrastructure seems to be associated
with a lesser work burden for women
(see Table 1). Women’s total working
hours are lower in communities
provided with water, and lower for
those living closer to the water source.
Conclusion
Access to water has a significant
impact on women’s time use. Poor
women from rural Ghana are also
time-poor, and the difficulty in accessing
water increases the time they spend on
both domestic and market activities.
Hence, having access to water
infrastructure can reduce the
time burden that women face.
It is not implicit, however, that the
time women save on water collection
would be devoted to paid activities.
Additional public policies are needed
to achieve that goal, especially policies
related to educational training and
childcare facilities.
Bardasi, E. and Q. Wodon (2006).
“Poverty Reduction from Full Employment:
A Time Use Approach”, MPRA Paper 11084,
World Bank (Washington, D.C.).
Becker, G. (1965). “A Theory of the Allocation
of Time”, The Economic Journal 75 (299),
pp. 493–517.
Coulombe, H. and Q. Wodon (2008).
“Time Use and Time Poverty in Ghana from
1991 to 2006”. Mimeographed document.
Ilahi, N. and F. Grimard (2000).
“Public Infrastructure and Private Costs:
Water Supply and Time Allocation of
Women in Rural Pakistan”, Economic
Development and Cultural Change 49 (1),
pp. 45–75.
Table 1
Impact of Infrastructure Provision on Women’s Time Allocation
Domestic work Market work Total work
Having community Decreases Probability of participation: decreases        Decreases
water provision
Shorter community Decreases Probability of participation: not significant        Decreases
distance from the Working hours: decreases
water source32 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Barriers to Community-
Based Water Supply
and Sanitation in India
In India, there is an urgent need to
address the institutional and social
obstacles to the provision of water
and sanitation. Institutional hurdles,
compounded by bureaucratic inertia and
the lack of political will to foster greater
convergence, create a breach between
project planning and implementation.
Meanwhile, attitudinal and socioeconomic
barriers pose challenges not just to
the operation and management
of community-based schemes but,
in some cases, to their very adoption.
Despite the large investments in water
infrastructure for drinking purposes
and other domestic uses, India still ranks
133rd among 180 countries for its poor
water availability—1,880 cubic metres per
person annually. Over 480 million people
(or at least 45 per cent of the population)
still lack access to adequate safe drinking
water (Pangare et al., 2006). Nonetheless,
figures on water supply coverage
indicate that India is well on its way
to covering its entire population of
more than 1 billion (see Figure 1).
The mid-term assessment report of the
Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
for water supply and sanitation shows that
India has surpassed Target 10 in terms of
nationwide water supply coverage (WHO
and UNICEF, 2006). According to that source,
87 per cent of the population was covered
in 2004, up from 70 per cent in 1990.
Of those covered in 2004, almost 70 per
cent lived in rural areas (Figure 1). These
national-level statistics seem to be at odds
with unofficial sources and, even if true,
they conceal wide regional disparities.
According to WHO and UNICEF (2006),
sanitation coverage increased from a mere
14 per cent to 33 per cent in the period
1990–2004, and most of the gains were
in rural areas (see Figure 2). The estimates
seem quite low, but it is possible that the
real circumstances are worse because
these figures are based on physical
infrastructure delivered, rather than on
observations of the actual practice of
indoor sanitation. Even in terms of nominal
sanitation, however, as indicated by
standard coverage, India appears to be
worse off than some low-income countries.
The questions that bedevil service
delivery in India’s water supply and
sanitation sector is why, despite more
than six decades of official efforts to
bring these utilities to the poor, access
to safe water is still highly inequitable
and open defecation remains widespread.
Studies reveal that there are problems
with the way in which these schemes are
planned and delivered by governments,
on one hand, and users’ receptivity of
the schemes, on the other.
On the supply side, the breach between
planning and effective implementation
in this sector by state agencies is due
to various factors, including the lack of
institutional convergence; the limited
budgets or personnel available for
implementation; an emphasis on meeting
delivery targets in infrastructural terms
rather than on the scheme’s long-term
management; the absolute discretionary
authority and lack of accountability
of state agencies; and, not least,
limited understanding of the fact that
by Nitish Jha,
Energy and Resources Institute,
New Delhi
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sociocultural factors play a substantial
role in determining why schemes
succeed or fail (McKenzie and Ray, 2005).
Community-Based Provision:
A Recent Institutional Innovation
Given these problems and the private
sector’s negligible presence in this field,
a new model is being tried, in keeping
with recent thinking in international
policy circles about how best to supply
these utilities to rural and some poor
urban communities. This fresh approach
combines water and sanitation delivery,
and entails transfer of the management
of the drinking water supply and
sanitation schemes from state
governments to user communities.
The main goal is to have communities
participate in the schemes’ management,
thereby increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of water delivery. There
are definite advantages to such an
institutional arrangement if the transfer
to community management is carried
out smoothly. These schemes often fail,
however, because mechanisms to foster




It is hoped that community members, led
by locally-elected water committees, will
be able to run their own schemes with
minimal external assistance. However, the
chief obstacle to an effective switch to
community management of water supply
is the prevailing view that water is a right
to be provided by the state. In many
cases where making water available
is problematic, it is hard to convince
capable people to play voluntary roles
in procuring and supplying water to
the larger community for a fee. A related
problem is that of using short-term
programmes to build much-needed
organisational capacity among the user
community in managerial, financial and
technical terms.
The dynamics of community decision-
making also deserve attention. In many
communities, disadvantaged groups
are excluded from decision-making
processes. A scheme’s design and
implementation should give due
consideration to the issue of who
performs tasks of system management.
Otherwise, it is very likely that the groups
with the heaviest burden in water and
sanitation management at the
household and community levels will be
put under further strain, simply because
they have no say in decisions that
adversely affect their welfare.
Another cornerstone of community
management is economic self-reliance,
especially in matters of day-to-day
operation and maintenance. Despite
expressions of willingness to pay during
a project’s initial stages, the subsequent
inability of a critical number of
households to pay for services
would threaten a scheme’s financial
sustainability. Hence, if a community
has a substantial proportion of poor
households that cannot afford even
minimal payments, it might be necessary
to use a subsidy from external sources or
cross-subsidies within the community.
As regards technical management,
agencies of the Indian government want
communities to retake the lead in water
and sanitation management (a role they
played before government supply was
instituted), but there is no explicit
recognition of the fact that the
technology for utility delivery has
changed considerably. This unfamiliarity
poses challenges because of issues such
as water treatment, as well as the use,
maintenance and repair of non-local and
largely invisible (that is, underground)
infrastructure (Black and Talbot, 2005).
Barriers to Community-Based
Sanitation Management
As with water supply schemes, social,
financial and technical factors limit
equitable access to sanitary facilities.
In the case of sanitation, however,
cultural and attitudinal barriers pose
challenges to the very adoption of
modern practices, let alone the operation
and management of community-based
schemes. In many parts of the country,
open defecation is a longstanding and
socially-sanctioned practice. The
implementation of community-based
schemes is bound to suffer if the delivery
of physical infrastructure is stressed
without addressing the attitudes that
are not conducive to its proper use.
From a social or religious viewpoint, the
non-adoption of indoor sanitation is due to
the perception of faeces as being ritually
and literally polluting. This attitude is
exacerbated by the negative view of toilets
being located close to homes because of
the smells they generate. Another major
obstacle to acceptance of toilets is the
need for maintenance. In households,
this duty—along with bringing water
for personal cleansing post-defecation,
as well as the socialisation of children in
matters of sanitation and hygiene—
usually falls to women.
Communal toilets are more cost-effective
than individual household toilets in
terms of the money and land they
require, but their maintenance problems
tend to be more serious. Different castes,
religions or ethnic groups in a community
have their own social norms, which include
restrictions on interactions with others.
Such limitations on group members not
only include rules about whom they may
trade with or marry, but also more
mundane matters such as with whom
they may eat, bathe or share a toilet.
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Failure to take account of such matters
often results in communal toilets being
built in a sanitary “no man’s land” or in
an area where one social group uses the
toilet to the exclusion of all others.
Because of the consequent lack of well-
defined roles and duties, these structures
are poorly maintained and ultimately fall
into disuse. Conversely, some
counterintuitive attitudinal factors result
in some village residents preferring open
defecation to indoor sanitation. For
instance, for relatively wealthy, high-
caste women who are otherwise subject
to ritual seclusion, communal defecation
allows for a degree of social interaction
that they would lose if they opted for
toilets in or near their homes.
Recommendations
Community schemes complement rather
than replace traditional water and
sanitation management. A scheme brings
with it a new set of tasks to be performed,
and thus imposes an additional burden.
Certain individuals bear the brunt of this
heavier burden of water and sanitation if
the new intervention ignores the existing
division of labour.
An explicit account of water- and
sanitation-related tasks and roles reveals
the extent of the burdens borne at
different levels within a community—
individuals, households and groups. For
example, an examination of the prevailing
gender division of labour in the rural
water and sanitation sector may highlight
the exclusion of women from decision-
making in both the household and public
realms, despite their responsibility for
many of the tasks in this sector. Based on
an appraisal of the gender division of
labour in any given community, therefore,
a concerted effort can be made to ensure
that women play a role equal to men in all
aspects of decision-making in the sector.
Other fault lines may stem from caste or
class. A caste-based analysis may show
that one group bears an inordinately
heavy burden for sanitation in the
community but is simultaneously
excluded from drawing water from the
village well. This burden will grow if social
relations remain unchanged, even as a
new scheme is being introduced. In India,
projects have been scuttled because local
elites have captured resources such as
water. Moreover, schemes are often
designed to exclude certain groups on
the basis of their caste or religion, which
may correlate with their weaker political
and economic status.
Thus, for community-managed utility
provision to be sustainable in the long
term, donor and implementing agencies
should pay more attention than they
have so far to social and attitudinal factors.
In the medium term, they should also
consider the importance of “handholding”
in the capacity building process. Until
such time as there is greater parity in
decision-making, there should be less
emphasis on participatory management
per se and more on factors such as
institutionalising leadership and rules,
building skills and creating knowledge.
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Efforts to privatise basic services can
have serious human rights consequences.
While the human rights framework does
not “prohibit” privatisation, it must guide
the design and implementation of
privatisation arrangements.
In the past, the “human rights agenda”
and the “development agenda” went
separate ways. Development assistance
was officially treated as apolitical
charity, heavily influenced by
geopolitics. The human rights
discourse was political and materialised
mostly as a gesture to ratify human rights
treaties, such as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child in 1989.
There was a tendency for communist
countries to highlight economic, social
and cultural rights and for capitalist
countries to prioritise civil and political
rights (hence the adoption of two
separate human rights treaties in
1966: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR).
Much of this only changed after the
end of the Cold War.
by Julia Kercher, Poverty Practice, Bureau
for Development Policy, UNDP Utility Privatisation
through the Lens
of Human Rights
By ratifying one of the
key international human
rights treaties governments
pledge to realise four
dimensions of human rights
in delivering basic services:
their availability, physical
and economic accessibility,
acceptability and quality.Poverty in Focus   August 2009    35
compromising equal, affordable and
physical access to sufficient, safe and
acceptable water” (CESCR, 2002, p. 9).
Human rights, therefore, provide a yardstick
to guide the adequate delivery of services.
Human Rights: Guiding Privatisation
A state’s main obligation in privatisation
processes is to protect people’s human
rights—in the case of water, for example,
by preventing third parties from adversely
affecting equal, affordable and physical
access to enough safe, acceptable water.
With this in mind, a number of practical
steps can be suggested from a human
rights perspective to guide the private
provision of basic services.
Undertake an impact assessment: Where such
assessments have been undertaken on
water privatisation projects, they have
been able to systematically identify risks,
for instance with regard to accessibility
and quality of the water supply; examples
include the Argentine cases documented
by Rights and Democracy (2007).
Consider alternatives through genuine public
participation: Governments that have
guaranteed the right to water in their
constitutions, as South Africa does, are
open to involving the private sector
but require local governments to first
consider public alternatives, including
community-managed schemes, social
privatisation or internationally-financed
schemes (COHRE et al., 2007).
Negotiate loan conditions with lenders: This is
often politically difficult, given many
countries’ dependence on support from
donor institutions. The renationalisation
of utilities in Bolivia, however, shows clearly
that civil society pressure can open up
space for governments to (re-)negotiate
concession contracts (see the article by
Hailu, Osorio and Tsukada in this issue).
Regulate private actors through legislation
and the design of service agreements: In their
duty to protect, states must regulate
third parties to ensure that privatisation
does not lead to a decline in access to
utilities by the poor. For example,
they need to ensure:
 Economic accessibility: Poor households
should not be disproportionately
burdened with water expenses
compared to richer households
(CESCR, 2002).
 Physical accessibility: Marginalised
populations such as indigenous
people and deprived urban
populations should obtain equal
access (and also to obviate the
danger that providers might “cherry-
pick” the most lucrative customers).
Monitor compliance of private actors and
ensure access to remedies: The draft
guidelines on the right to water
presented to the UN Sub-Commission
on Human Rights (UN, 2005) call for the
establishment or the authorisation of
independent institutions such as human
rights commissions or regulatory
agencies to carry out monitoring
activities in a manner that ensures
full transparency and accountability.
In addition, the guidelines stress
that everyone should have access to
administrative or judicial procedures
in order to complain about acts or
omissions in contravention of the
right to water and sanitation.
In summary, using a human rights
framework as a guide is not only a
matter of legal obligation for states that
have signed the relevant human rights
treaties. It is also vital for setting and
raising standards of a life in dignity
across countries.
CESCR (2002). General Comment No. 15: The
Right to Water. Geneva, UN Committee on
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Privatisation: Impact on Human Rights
By ratifying one of the key international
human rights treaties, the ICESCR,
governments pledge to realise four
dimensions of human rights in delivering
basic services: their availability, physical
and economic accessibility, acceptability
and quality. But reality is often different.
For instance, Bolivia’s “water war”
in Cochabamba attracted significant
attention for human rights reasons.
The government followed the World
Bank’s recommendation that no subsidies
should be given to ameliorate the
increase in water tariffs. Tariffs increased
by as much as 200 per cent. For some,
this translated into bills that amounted
to 20–25 per cent of household monthly
income. Privatisation, moreover, did not
adequately protect their customary uses of
water, such as for agriculture. Widespread
protests and civil unrest ensued, which
eventually led to the cancellation of the
concession. Did the Bolivian government
violate its people’s economic rights?
The sharp increase in water tariffs made it
difficult for many Bolivians to economically
access (afford) water. Households were cut
off from the water supply altogether,
so people may not have been able to
physically access water. By disallowing
customary indigenous uses, the
arrangement did not ensure that water
was supplied in ways that are culturally
acceptable. Privatisation arrangements can
also affect water quality, such as when
close monitoring by a regulator is lacking.
Signatory states also have three kinds of
obligations: to respect, protect and fulfil
human rights. While the obligation to
respect requires that the state itself refrain
from interfering with the enjoyment of
people’s human rights, the obligation
to protect requires a state to prevent third
parties from interfering with those rights.
The obligation to fulfil requires states
to actively strengthen people’s ability to
meet their own needs and, if individuals
or groups cannot provide for themselves
in exceptional cases, to provide the
realisation of those human rights.
In the case of the privatisation of
basic services, the emphasis of a state’s
obligation is on protecting the human
rights of people relative to private actors.
The relevant UN committee thus stresses
that “where water services […] are
operated or controlled by third parties,
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